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ABSTRACT
The spread of the recent pandemic, COVID-19—which began
in Wuhan, in December of 2019—has created an unprecedented
impact on public health in the United States and across the
world. As of October 2021, the United States reported over 44 million infection cases and over 720,000 deaths. Those cases represent over 18 percent of the reported infection cases in the world,
whereas the population of the United States is less than four percent of the world population. The United States has not been successful in managing this pandemic and stopping its spread effectively even though it has the largest medical, financial, and
administrative resources in the world. This article analyzes the
legal and institutional causes of this failure and explores possible
remedies in three areas: provision of public healthcare to combat
the pandemic; the regulation of public conduct to prevent the
spread of the pandemic; and public access to information. The
article also calls for a new approach; it explains why a law and
development approach is relevant and applies the General Theory
of Law and Development to assess the proposed remedies. The article advocates for law and institutions as remedies to fill the gaps
created by ineffective political leadership in the management of
COVID-19.
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INTRODUCTION
The current global pandemic of a coronavirus (SARS-CoV2)—which began in Wuhan, China, in December 2019
(hereinafter “COVID-19”)—has had an unprecedented impact on
public health in the United States and around the world. As of
August 18, 2021, there were over 44.8 million cases and nearly
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720,000 deaths in the United States.1 The pandemic has also
resulted in enormous economic and social costs: unemployment
reached unprecedented levels with more than 40 million
unemployment benefit claims filed2 and the unemployment rate
peaked at 14.7 percent, higher than any previous period since
the Second World War.3 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimated in May 2020 that the gross domestic product (GDP)
would be $3.9 trillion lower over the 2020–2021 period than the
January 2020 estimates.4
The United States has failed to manage COVID-19, as
evidenced by its large numbers of infections and deaths.5 The
number of infection cases in the United States accounts for over
18 percent of the reported infection cases across the world,6
whereas the population of the United States is around 4 percent
of the world population.7 The rate of infection, 13.6 percent of
1. COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Aug. 16, 2021), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_dailycases
[https://perma.cc/RG3J-TA2K] [hereinafter COVID Data Tracker].
2. Mathieu Despard et al., COVID-19 Job and Income Loss Leading to
More Hunger and Financial Hardship, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2020), https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/13/covid-19-job-and-income-loss-leadingto-more-hunger-and-financial-hardship/ [https://perma.cc/N4N2-7L3Z].
3. Elizabeth Weeks, Private Insurance Limits and Responses, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-1 95, 95 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5956e16e6b8f5b8c45f1c216/t/5f4d657822
5705285562d0f0/1598908033901/COVID19PolicyPlaybook_Aug2020+Full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQ2H-B4G3] (describing the effect of the COVID-19
pandemic on unemployment rates and the pandemic’s relation to the private
insurance market).
4. Letter from Phillip Swagel, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (June 9, 2020) (on file with
Congressional Budget Office), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-06/56395CBO-Pelosi-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8FL-JB7H].
5. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 1.
6. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing United States COVID19 cumulative cases which was approximately 44.8 million on October 18, 2021);
WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
(Aug. 16, 2021), https://covid19.who.int/ [https://perma.cc/P7SV-QXAS]
(showing worldwide COVID-19 cumulative cases: approximately 240 million on
October 18, 2021).
7. See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://w
ww.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2021) (showing the United States
population on October 18, 2021, was 332,854,281); International Data Base
(IDB), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#
/country?COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2021&menu=countryViz&COUNTRY_YEAR
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the population as of October 18, 2021, was 20.6 times higher
than the infection rate of South Korea, 0.66 percent of the
population.8 This outcome is baffling considering the vast
medical, financial, and administrative resources that the United
States has at its disposal and several measures that it has taken,
including travel restrictions imposed in January 2020, the
declaration of a national emergency and enactment of COVID19 legislation in March, stay-at-home orders imposed by early
April in most states,9 and the availability of vaccines to most of
the population since the spring of 2021.10
All these efforts did not effectively work to control the
spread of the pandemic, as there was a crucial missing link: the
United States failed to conduct timely testing, contact tracing,
quarantine, and treatment (TCQT) that was critically important
to control the spread of the disease (and minimize subsequent
deaths)11 in the first few crucial weeks of the pandemic, in the
=2021 (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (showing midyear world population of
7,772,850,805).
8. The rates are calculated from the infection cases as of October 18, 2021.
See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1; Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19),
Republic of Korea, KOREA DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION AGENCY (Oct. 18,
2021), http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/ [https://perma.cc/S2AA-EKS6] [hereinafter
Coronavirus in Korea] (showing cumulative cases on October 18, 2021 was
343,445); The World Factbook: South Korea, CENT. INTEL. AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-soci
ety (last updated Sept. 22, 2021) (estimating July 2021 South Korea population
of 51,715,162).
9. Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State,
and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID19, supra note 3, at 10–19.
10. See Julie Bosman & Lauren Leatherby, U.S. Coronavirus Death Toll
Surpasses 700,000 Despite Wide Availability of Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/01/us/us-covid-deaths-700k.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/JKQ2-MD6S] (detailing how the United States reached the
milestone of 700,000 COVID deaths despite the vaccines being widely
availability for months).
11. There is widespread agreement that test-trace-isolate (quarantine) is
the bare minimum for an effective pandemic response. See, e.g., Selina Rajan,
Jonathan Cylus & Martin McGee, Successful Find-Test-Trace-Isolate-Support
Systems: How to Win at Snakes and Ladders, 26 EUROHEALTH 34, 34 (2020)
(“Any country thinking of easing COVID-19 lockdowns must be confident that
they have a robust system in place to find, test, trace, isolate, and support
(FTTIS) new cases.”). Reports also confirm that countries that adopted a test,
track, and treat approach gained an early edge against COVID-19. Test, Track,
Treat, GLOB. HEALTH NOW, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.globalhealthnow.org/2020-04/test-track-treat [https
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months of February 2020 through early March 2020.12 Facing
the unprecedented pandemic, the Trump administration failed
to ensure that a sufficient number of test kits were made
available for those who needed testing.13 By comparison, in late
February, South Korea was testing more than 10,000 people
each day, reportedly four times the number that the United
States had tested over the previous one and a half months.14 By
mid-March, when the number of infections was sharply
increasing in the United States,15 South Korea had tested more
than a quarter-million people, whereas the United States had

://perma.cc/3XCG-G9QL]. The value of therapeutic treatment can be marginal,
particularly for patients with mild symptoms or asymptomatic patients, but it
is more important for patients with more serious conditions. Interim Clinical
Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management
-patients.html [https://perma.cc/MC4U-EFVA]. Treatment is, thus, an essential
component of disease control, the notion that includes recovery of patients from
the disease.
12. See Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test
Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/UV3QZL8]. A recent article suggests, based on evidence, that limited United States
community transmission likely began in late January or early February 2020
when there was no extensive testing or contact tracing in place. Michelle A.
Jorden et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United
States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 680,
680 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6922e1.htm?s_c
id=mm6922e1_w [https://perma.cc/YC2R-RMB2]; see also Lindsay Maizland &
Claire Felter, Comparing Six Health-Care Systems in a Pandemic, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/comparingsix-health-care-systems-pandemic [https://perma.cc/36LA-DRQ4]; cf. Sean
Fleming, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Explains How the Country Contained
COVID-19, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.weforum.org
/agenda/2020/03/south-korea-covid-19-containment-testing/ [https://perma.cc/V
PS4-4QQ8] (summarizing South Korea’s efforts to battle COVID-19 through a
rapid and extensive testing plan).
13. Shear et al., supra note 12.
14. Matt Berger, How South Korea Successfully Battled COVID-19 While
the U.S. Didn’t, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/heal
th-news/what-south-korea-has-done-correctly-in-battling-covid-19 [https://per
ma.cc/XU8J-F3D7].
15. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (charting cumulative cases per day
dating back to January 2020). Since the first suspected case of COVID-19 in the
United States on January 19, 2020, the number of cumulative cases increased
to 1,661 on March 5; 11,837 on March 15; 100,580 on March 25; and 406,788 on
April 6. Id.
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tested fewer than 60,000 people.16 Not only South Korea but
virtually every other OECD country that had more than onehundred COVID-19 infection cases by mid-March (except
Mexico) tested more than the United States (per thousand).17
Without sufficient tests to identify those infected, contact
tracing could not be effectively performed, and no extensive
contact tracing system was in place, allowing for rapid
transmission of the disease.18 Isolation and quarantine were left
to the discretion of infected individuals and others who may have
contracted the virus, without any mechanism for enforcement or
monitoring in place. As to treatment, successful countries, such
as South Korea, isolated all COVID-19 patients, categorized
them into one of two groups—one for patients with mild or no
symptoms and the other for patients with more serious
conditions—and treated the former in Community Treatment
Centers (CTCs)19 (residential clinics converted from existing
facilities) and the latter in hospitals.20 By contrast, this type of
isolated care was available in the United States only to patients
with serious conditions; patients with mild or no symptoms had
to wait at home until their conditions deteriorated enough to be
admitted for such care or until they recovered, risking the spread
of the disease to others during the unmonitored wait.21
16. Rebecca Ballhaus, U.S. vs. South Korea: Behind the Coronavirus
Testing Numbers, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s
-vs-south-korea-behind-the-coronavirus-testing-numbers-11589324531 [https:/
/perma.cc/5NXV-ZFWM].
17. Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19), OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourw
orldindata.org/coronavirus-testing [https://perma.cc/K88Z-6KUU] (last visited
Nov. 18, 2020).
18. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing the increase in
COVID-19 infections).
19. Won Suk Choi et al., Community Treatment Centers for Isolation of
Asymptomatic and Mildly Symptomatic Patients with Coronavirus Disease,
South Korea, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2338, 2338 (2020), https://dx
.doi.org/10.3201/eid2610.201539 [https://perma.cc/2QHK-PAWK].
20. In December 2020, South Korea also started to show a lack of hospital
beds for COVID-19 patients. Thomas Maresca, South Korea Hits New COVID19 Record, Faces Hospital Bed Shortage, UPI (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.upi.c
om/Top_News/World-News/2020/12/16/South-Korea-hits-new-COVID-19record-faces-hospital-bed-shortage/4901608104740/ [https://perma.cc/L367-4A
NN].
21. The CDC guidelines have recommended that COVID-19 patients with
mild symptoms “stay home” (except to get medical care), but there is no
apparent provision for enforcement of quarantine, monitoring, or treatment of
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Without effective testing (both lack of sufficient test kits and
effective test protocols), contact tracing, and quarantine,22 the
number of infections increased rapidly in early March 2020,23
prompting states to issue stay-at-home orders24 to slow the
spread of the virus and to buy time to secure needed medical
resources and facilities.25 The infection curve began to flatten in
early April26 when most states had stay-at-home orders in
place,27 but the weeks under such orders (i.e., closure of
businesses except those deemed “essential”)28 put enormous
economic pressure on businesses, causing a record number of job

these patients with milder symptoms. What to Do If You Are Sick, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov
/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html#:~:text=Stay%20home.,Do%20not%20v
isit%20public%20areas [https://perma.cc/6YQD-CZD8] (last updated Sept. 11,
2020).
22. The term “quarantine” traditionally has not been applied to people who
were infected, but the term includes the notion of “isolation” that is applied to
patients. Quarantine v. Isolation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/easy-to-read/COVID-19-Quarantin
e-vs-Isolation.html#:~:text=Quarantine%20Helps%20Slow%20the%20Spread
,people%20in%20their%20home (last updated Jan. 8, 2021).
23. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing increasing infection
cases from early March to early April).
24. Stay-at-home orders, lockdown orders, or shelter-in-place orders
restrict the movement of individuals. These terms are used interchangeably
throughout this article without distinction. For a discussion of lockdown orders
imposed by states, see Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the
Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 10–19.
25. See id. at 12.
26. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1.
27. Amanda Moreland et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19
Stay-at-Home Orders and Changes in Population Movement — United States,
March 1–May 31, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1198, 1200
fig.1 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm [https://
perma.cc/Y3TW-BVAC].
28. Essential businesses include utilities, gas stations, hospitals, grocery
stores, pharmacies, and others that are considered essential for maintaining
life. See, e.g., Margaret A. Honein et al., Summary of Guidance for Public Health
Strategies to Address High Levels of Community Transmission of SARS-CoV-2
and Related Deaths, December 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
1860, 1864 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6949e2.htm
[https://perma.cc/D7QN-X5BL] (“Essential (critical infrastructure) workers
include health care personnel and employees in other essential workplaces (e.g.,
first responders and grocery store workers).”).
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losses.29 As the stay-at-home orders were lifted in many states
and the summer began, the number of infections started to soar
in June 2020.30 The center of the pandemic also moved from the
Northeast United States to the South (Georgia, Texas, and
Florida) and West (California).31 At the time of writing, the
number of infection cases across the United States has passed
another peak, reaching 192,211 new cases on September 1, 2021
(despite the availability of vaccines), which was substantially
higher than in the period from March to August 2020 (peaked at
78,252 infection cases on July 17, 2020).32 As of October 2021,
over 40 percent of the United States population has not been
fully vaccinated,33 creating the risk of further spread of the
disease and mutation of the virus such as the Delta and Lambda
variants.34
This article examines the legal and institutional issues in
the management of the pandemic in the United States. Other
countries that have controlled the pandemic more successfully
were more effective in TCQT in the early stages of the
pandemic.35 For example, South Korea, thanks to an intense
TCQT campaign in the first few weeks of the pandemic, never
resorted to economically burdensome measures such as stay-athome orders but successfully controlled the spread of the disease
29. In April 2020 alone, over 20.5 million jobs were lost. Payroll
Employment Down 20.5 Million in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (May 12, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/payroll-employ
ment-down-20-point-5-million-in-april-2020.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA2J-27D
M].
30. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing an increase in daily
average cases in June).
31. See id. (charting daily new case rate per 100,000 people in HHS Regions
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9).
32. See id.
33. As of October 17, 2021, 42.8 percent of the population has not been fully
vaccinated. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker: See Your State’s Progress, MAYO
CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/coronavirus-covid-19/vaccine-tracker
[hereinafter U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker].
34. According to reports, the available vaccines may not be fully effective
against the Delta and Lambda variants. See Nancy Lapid, Delta Infections
Among Vaccinated Likely Contagious; Lambda Variant Shows Vaccine
Resistance in Lab, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/h
ealthcare-pharmaceuticals/delta-infections-among-vaccinated-likely-contagiou
s-lambda-variant-shows-vaccine-2021-08-02/.
35. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 12; Berger, supra note 14; Ballhaus, supra
note 16.
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at a much lower level.36 In South Korea, laws not only authorize
but require the government to provide testing and treatment for
infectious diseases and to cover the costs.37 There was also a
publicly trusted disease control center in South Korea, Korea
Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA, formerly The
Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), supported
by political leaders, including the President of the country,
functioning as an institutional command center that guided the
implementation of TCQT.38
On the contrary, the laws and institutions in the United
States have failed to function effectively to control the spread of
the disease at an acceptable level. The President has vast
statutory powers to adopt measures necessary to mandate TCQT
under the Public Health Services Act (PHSA),39 but the Trump
administration failed to coordinate effectively with state and
local governments40 to implement TCQT in a timely manner.41
Former President Trump downplayed the risk of the pandemic
and encouraged premature re-opening of schools and businesses
to minimize the economic impact of the disease, which was
expected to affect his presidential re-election in November

36. As of October 18, 2021, South Korea had a 0.66 percent per capita
infection rate (343,445 infected in a population of roughly 51.71 million), a small
fraction of the 11.2% per capita infection rate in the United States (37.2 million
infected in a population of roughly 332.6 million). Compare Coronavirus in
Korea, supra note 8, with COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (illustrating the
infection numbers per capita in each country).
37. Specifically, the law provides that “[e]ach citizen shall have the right to
receive the diagnosis and medical treatment of any infectious disease under this
Act at a medical institution, and the State and local governments shall bear
expenses incurred therein.” Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Act
No. 17475, Aug. 12, 2020, art. 6(3) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation
Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do
(search required).
38. See About KDCA, KOR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION AGENCY, http
://www.kdca.go.kr/contents.es?mid=a30101000000 [https://perma.cc/7MTB-YP
GU] (last updated Sept. 11, 2020).
39. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300mm–61 (codified provisions of the
PHSA).
40. Throughout this paper, the term “local government” includes tribal
governments of Indigenous Native Americans.
41. See Lindsay Wiley et al., Health Reform Reconstruction, 55 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 34–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3760086 [hereinafter Health Reform Reconstruction].
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2020.42 The split authority between the federal and the state and
local governments, which are characteristic of the United States
federal legal structure, did not allow a consistent and effective
response to COVID-19 throughout the nation without strong
political leadership at the presidential level.43
Some attribute the failure to bad politics and characterize
the failed COVID-19 management as a political failure,44 rather
than an institutional failure, but it is an institutional failure;
i.e., effective laws and institutions are functional in the
prevailing political reality. Such laws and institutions reduce
the adversarial political effects, even though they may not
operate completely outside politics and increase chances for
success. Laws and institutions that fail to do so, such as those
currently operating in the United States, require adjustments
and reform. The administration may have changed, but there is
no assurance against the recurrence of dysfunctional politics.
Also, the sluggish vaccination campaign, which has left a large
portion of the population unvaccinated,45 indicates that there is
a fundamental structural issue regardless of politics and the
change of the administration. The gaps and flaws of the current
laws and institutions must be identified, and necessary
adjustments must be made to improve their effectiveness in the
political reality that we have experienced.
42. Brian Bennett, Why Coronavirus May Be the Biggest Threat Yet to
Donald Trump’s Re-election, TIME (Mar. 10, 2020), https://time.com/5800093/co
ronavirus-donald-trump-2020-election
[https://perma.cc/Q6C3-FKYF];
see
Anita Kumar & Nicole Gaudiano, Trump Wants to Reopen Schools. Hint: It’s
Not Just About Education, POLITICO (July 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/ne
ws/2020/07/08/trump-reopen-schools-353245 (discussing Donald Trump’s plan
to prematurely reopen schools to help boost the economy); see also John E.
Owens, Donald Trump’s Re-election Prospects, 11 POL. INSIGHT 8, 8 (2020), ht
tps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2041905820958815?journalCode=pl
ia [https://perma.cc/Y6EB-87CR] (analyzing the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic, along with other factors, on Donald Trump’s reelection prospects).
43. Lindsay F. Wiley, Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 65–70 [hereinafter
Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response].
44. See, e.g., George Pearkes, America’s COVID Response Was Always
Doomed to Fail, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com
/us-covid-19-response-destined-fail-because-political-economic-system-2020-10
(analyzing America’s COVID-19 response as a “function of pre-COVID political
economy”).
45. As of October 17, 2021, over 40 percent of the population has not been
fully vaccinated. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, supra note 33.
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Part I of the article analyzes structural problems in three
areas: healthcare provision in the context of the pandemic;
regulation of conduct for disease control; and public access to
information. Part II examines the current legal and institutional
frameworks for healthcare (as applied to the pandemic
management) and public access to information. The regulatory
gaps in the current frameworks necessitate reform. The article
calls for a new approach to resolve these problems. Part III
discusses the relevance of the law and development approach to
addressing the problems associated with COVID-19
management and introduces the recently-developed General
Theory of Law and Development (the General Theory) as a new
analytical device to assess the impact of the proposed reform.
Part IV applies the General Theory46 and assesses such impact
against its analytical factors, such as regulatory design,
regulatory compliance, and the quality of implementation. Part
V draws conclusions.
I.

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

A. COPING WITH COVID-19 UNDER THE PRIVATE HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM
To combat COVID-19 effectively, there must be unfettered
access to necessary medical services, including diagnostic tests
and treatment. The United States is known to possess the
world’s most advanced medical technology, highly trained
medical professionals, and state-of-the-art facilities and
equipment, but its patchwork delivery system has exposed flaws
and weaknesses, particularly in the course of this unprecedented
pandemic.47

46. Section III.B infra introduces the General Theory; see also Yong-Shik
Lee, General Theory of Law and Development, 50 CORNELL INT’L L. REV. 415,
423–56 (2017) [hereinafter Gen. Theory] (discussing the background and
framework of the General Theory of law and development); YONG-SHIK LEE,
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 38–61 (2019) [hereinafter
THEORY AND PRACTICE] (introducing the framework and basic elements of the
General Theory of law and development).
47. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 95 (“The COVID-19 pandemic exposed a
number of existing flaws in the United States’ patchwork approach to paying
for and providing access to medical care.”); see also Health Reform
Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 34 (“The U.S. response to the COVID
pandemic was dependent on an incoherent and inequitable state-by-state
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Unlike most other industrialized countries, which maintain
publicly-funded, universal healthcare systems, the United
States maintains a predominantly private healthcare system.48
In 2019, private insurance programs covered 55.5 percent of the
population,49 and supplementary public healthcare coverages
such as Medicare and Medicaid, applying only to select qualified
groups (Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for low-income
families and individuals), covered 34 percent at some point
during 2019.50 Employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), with varied
terms, premium rates, and coverages, command a plurality
share in the insurance market—49.6 percent of Americans
depended on ESI coverage in 2019.51 As a result, access to
medical services varies widely among Americans, depending on
the terms of their insurance. In 2019, the average annual

patchwork approach to distributing the burdens and benefits of public
investments in health.”). Wiley et al. describe the problems caused by the
predominantly private health care system in the pandemic response. They
observe, “The privatized nature of the U.S.’s health care system has hampered
the COVID pandemic response. A system that depends on private health
financing lacks the breadth, capacity, and financial incentives to deliver
widespread public health measures, such as testing or vaccination, at levels
necessary to be effective and equitable. Instead, our private health insurance
system creates cost-barriers to basic public health measures at every step.” Id.
at 38.
48. See Chris Slaybaugh, International Healthcare Systems: The US Versus
the World, AXENE HEALTH PARTNERS, https://axenehp.com/international-healt
hcare-systems-us-versus-world/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (discussing the
healthcare systems of industrialized countries and stating that “[t]he United
States is the only industrialized country in the world that does not have
Universal Health Coverage for all citizens.”).
49. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTi
meframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22
asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/LS96-FKN9] [hereinafter Health Insurance
Coverage].
50. Id. 9.2 percent of the population was uninsured in 2019. KATHERINE
KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2019, at 3 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census
/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-271.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBX4-HANC].
For a review of the United States healthcare system, see LEIYU SHI & DOUGLAS
A. SINGH, ESSENTIALS OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (5th ed. 2018)
(providing an overview of the United States healthcare system and its primary
characteristics); see also RAYMOND L. GOLDSTEEN ET AL., JONAS’ INTRODUCTION
TO THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (9th ed. 2020) (providing a description of,
and commentary on, the United States healthcare system).
51. Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 49.
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premium for employer-based family coverage amounted to
$20,576; for single coverage, $7,188.52 Employers contribute to
the premium, but the rate of contribution varies.53
The high cost of insurance premiums resulted in 29.6
million Americans being uninsured in 2019.54 However, the
number of uninsured individuals has substantially declined
since the adoption of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) in 2010 that removed some of the barriers to obtaining
health insurance, such as pre-existing condition exclusions, and
created the government-sponsored Marketplace (subsidizing
premium payments through a direct tax credit in accordance
with income level).55 The ACA reform had its limits: without a
public insurance option,56 it did not eliminate the uninsured who
were not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare but could not afford
even the subsidized premium available on the Marketplace.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB
v. Sebelius weakened another important ACA coverage strategy,
which was to expand Medicaid to United States citizens and
qualified non-citizens below 138 percent of the federal poverty
level, by finding that states had an option, not an obligation, to
expand Medicaid under the terms of the ACA.57 This resulted in,
to date, thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C. expanding
Medicaid and twelve states not expanding it.58
52. Weeks, supra note 3, at 100.
53. See id. (detailing health insurance options for the unemployed).
54. KEISLER-STARKEY & BUNCH, supra note 50, at 3.
55. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 95–96 (discussing how the ACA reformed
United States private insurance).
56. The ACA instead introduced the Consumer Operated and Oriented
Plan (CO-OP) Program, which sought to increase market competition by
offering nonprofit plans from insurers with “a strong consumer focus,” but many
failed shortly after launch. Sabrina Corlette et al., WHY ARE MANY CO-OPS
FAILING?: HOW NEW NONPROFIT HEALTH PLANS HAVE RESPONDED TO MARKET
COMPETITION 7, 9 (2015), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/file
s/documents/___media_files_publications_fund_report_2015_dec_1847_corlette
_why_are_many_coops_failing.pdf [https://perma.cc/87E2-UMNM] (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 18042(c)(3)(C)).
57. Weeks, supra note 3, at 95; NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548–58
(2012) (finding that mandating the Medicaid expansion provision of the
Affordable Care Act exceeded Congress’s spending power under the
Constitution).
58. Weeks, supra note 3, at 95. Missouri approved Medicaid expansion in
the summer of 2020. Alex Smith, Missouri Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion
Despite Resistance from Republican Leaders, NPR (Aug. 5, 2020) https://www.n
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The absence of a publicly-funded, universal healthcare
system created uncertainty for public access to COVID-19
testing and treatment.59 In the early weeks of the pandemic,
when a large number of tests and treatment should have been
made available to the public to contain the disease, unclarity
concerning out-of-pocket cost60 discouraged the public,
particularly those without insurance or with only limited
coverages, from seeking testing and treatment, contributing to
the failure to contain the disease in the early stages of the
pandemic.61 In contrast, other countries operating a publiclyfunded universal healthcare system were able to confirm that
the testing and treatment would be provided free of charge or at
an affordable rate so that the cost concern would not impede the
effort to contain the disease.62

pr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/05/898899246/missouri-voters-approvemedicaid-expansion-despite-resistance-from-republican-le [https://perma.cc/U
QL8-VEZA].
59. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 15 (“[T]he
diffusion of authority between levels of government, fragmented fiscal supports,
and the many diverse providers in our largely privatized health care system
have led to a U.S. failure to fairly allocate, adequately supply, or constrain
prices for essential testing, therapeutics, and vaccines. Widespread public
health measures may be delivered more effectively in countries with a
centralized and unified public health care delivery system.”).
60. According to a report, a single symptomatic case of COVID-19 could cost
an individual a median of $3,045 during the course of infection. Sarah M.
Bartsch et al., The Potential Health Care Costs and Resource Use Associated
With COVID-19 in the United States, 39 HEALTH AFF. 927, 929 (2020), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00426 [https://perma.cc/L
N7H-R8GH].
61. See Dan Witters, In U.S., 14% With Likely COVID-19 to Avoid Care Due
to Cost, GALLUP (Apr. 28, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/309224/avoidcare-likely-covid-due-cost.aspx [https://perma.cc/PR2P-CMNS]. For example,
some states’ websites, such as California (ca.gov) and Georgia (georgia.gov),
made it clear that COVID-19 testing was free to patients, but others, including
Minnesota (mn.gov) and North Dakota (nd.gov), did not make the information
as clear. This was partly because there could be charges associated with visiting
a doctor outside of the test, even though COVID-19 tests were supposed to be
free. Federal and state governments referred individuals to their insurance
companies to confirm costs.
62. See, e.g., Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Act No. 17475,
Aug. 12, 2020, art. 6(3) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research
Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (search
required) (declaring that in South Korea the State has the responsibility to
cover the cost of tests and treatment).
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The limited availability of test kits in the early weeks of the
pandemic, as well as the absence of a cure or vaccine, were as
much an impediment as cost, so not all of the early failure can
be attributed to the patchwork healthcare system in the United
States. Moreover, adjustments were made to the law, such as a
requirement that all ACA-compliant and other comprehensive
group and non-group health insurance plans cover testing for
detection or diagnosis of COVID-19 as well as vaccinations
without cost-sharing.63 Another adjustment was a mandate that
required reimbursement of hospital costs for the treatment of
uninsured patients.64 Also, a substantial number of workers who
had lost their jobs and ESI during the pandemic were able to
obtain health insurance through the Marketplace and
Medicaid.65 In addition, the ACA provided states with an option
to expand Medicaid coverage,66 and most hospitals (i.e., all of the

63. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) of 2020 §§
6001–6004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3) (2020); Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020 § 3201 (amending
FFCRA § 6001 to apply coverage without cost-sharing to out-of-network tests),
§ 3203(a), 41 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020). The Trump administration’s guidance
on the CARES Act and FFCRA reduced the scope of coverage by requiring
insurers to cover the costs of COVID-19 testing for “diagnostic purposes” and
when deemed “medically appropriate” by an individual’s attending medical
provider. See FAQs About Families First Coronavirus Response Act and
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act Implementation Part 43,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 5–6 (June 23, 2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/FFCRA-Part-43-FAQs.pdf
(interpreting
Section 6001 of the FFCRA to not cover COVID-19 testing unless medically
appropriate and diagnostic, and excluding coverage for “testing conducted to
screen for general workplace health and safety (such as employee ‘return to
work’ programs), for public health surveillance for SARS-CoV-2, or for any other
purpose not primarily intended for individualized diagnosis or treatment of
COVID-19”).
64. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act §
3211, § 42 U.S.C. 254b(r) (amended). Wiley et al. report the risk that an
uninsured patient could nevertheless be charged for their COVID-19 care.
Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 40.
65. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 99–100 (explaining that state insurance
Marketplaces opened enrollment due to the pandemic and that “[i]n April 2020
alone, Marketplace enrollment due to unemployment increased by 139%
compared to April 2019”).
66. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER
FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activityaround-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe
=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%
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Medicare-participating hospitals) were not allowed to turn down
patients requiring emergency care, including COVID-19
patients, due to cost considerations.67
These adjustments, however, were not sufficient to contain
the pandemic. The costly split between federal and state
authorities over healthcare and insurance regulation has caused
further delay in removing uncertainty inherent in the patchwork
system, blocking a uniform remedy in the early stages of the
pandemic.68 The cost of COVID-19 treatment was not addressed
by legislation; coverage limits, existing among private insurance
plans, as well as cost-sharing requirements, remained
applicable, with elements of “surprise” medical bills.69 In the
absence of any federal initiative to provide universal coverage
for testing and treatment of COVID-19,70 states may attempt to
fill the gap by enacting broader COVID-19 coverage
requirements.71 But federal preemption currently in place limits
the effect of state reform: the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) precludes additional state
requirements from application to self-insured ESI plans that
cover the majority (60 percent) of people who receive insurance

7D (last updated Sept. 8, 2021); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) of 2010, § 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (amended) (2010).
67. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986,
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018); see also Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor
Act (EMTALA) Requirements and Implications Related to Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) (Revised), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 30,
2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/qso-20-15-hospital-cah-emtala-revis
ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/L735-QCGU] [hereinafter EMTALA Requirements].
68. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Federalism Complicates the Response to the
COVID-19 Health and Economic Crisis: What Can Be Done?, 45 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL’Y & L. 951, 951–52 (2020).
69. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 98; see also Mark Fendrick, COVID-19 Care
is (Mostly) Free to Patients. Should Other Vital Care Be Too?, U. MICH. HEALTH
LAB BLOG (May 19, 2020), https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/industry-dx/covid-19care-mostly-free-to-patients-should-other-vital-care-be-too [https://perma.cc/A
Y2S-LJ4N].
70. The CARES Act required insurers to cover the cost of COVID-19 tests
but did not impose a maximum amount that providers can charge for the tests,
inviting price gouging. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act, § 3202, 42 U.S.C. § 256b. The funding made available through the
FFCRA and CARES Act did not remove the cost uncertainty.
71. Some states, such as New Mexico, Massachusetts, Vermont, and
Minnesota, have required health plans to limit or eliminate the cost of COVID19 treatment. Weeks, supra note 3, at 99.
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through employers;72 thus, most ESI-insured individuals are
covered by insurance plans not subject to state regulation, and
state reform will not benefit them.73
A broader initiative to expand access to healthcare services
needs to be made at the federal level, but this is not to suggest
that the federal government should completely overtake states’
authority over healthcare regulation, which would be neither
feasible nor desirable, even during the current pandemic.
However, it would have been entirely possible and even
necessary for the federal government to provide, after extensive
consultations with states, uniform guidelines on providing
affordable access to testing and treatment and to coordinate with
states to ensure that those in need have timely access to testing
and treatment. Nevertheless, such political leadership and
federal-state cooperation were lacking, and states—many with
resource shortages—were left to deal with the pandemic
situation without coordinated support from the federal
government.74 The current impediment may call for a deeper
overhaul of the healthcare system, such as the adoption of a
public insurance option or a single-payer system that has
operated successfully in other countries that have better
handled the pandemic.75 The proposed reform will not opt for
either of such options but will mandate more extensive federal
government engagement on healthcare issues and facilitate
closer coordination between federal and state authorities.76
Lastly, the current healthcare system does not adequately
address the disproportionate effect that the pandemic has on
different racial and income groups.77 According to studies, racial
minorities and low-income communities have an increased risk
of hospitalization and death from COVID-19.78 Racial

72. Id. at 97.
73. See id.
74. Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, supra note 43, at 65;
see also Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 2.
75. See Maizland & Felter, supra note 12.
76. This point is further explained in Section III.B infra.
77. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 15–16.
78. Wyatt Koma et al., Low-Income and Communities of Color at Higher
Risk of Serious Illness if Infected with Coronavirus, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(May 7, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/low-
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minorities, for instance, reportedly require hospitalization at
nearly five times the rate of white adults79 likely due, in part, to
higher levels of underlying health conditions, such as obesity,
asthma, and chronic metabolic diseases, including diabetes and
cardiovascular disease.80 These health issues are often clustered
in low-income communities due to environmental factors, such
as air, water, and soil pollutants that exacerbate the
complications of airborne viruses, including COVID-19.81
Additional adverse factors include crowded housing conditions,
jobs that cannot be performed remotely, inconsistent access to
healthcare, and stress leading to weaker immunity.82 Minorities
and lower-income groups, despite being at a higher risk of
having more serious complications related to COVID-19, are
more likely to avoid healthcare due to fears of out-of-pocket
expenses—a conclusion demonstrated in a survey that shows 58
percent of non-White respondents have concerns or “extreme”
concerns about the out-of-pocket costs for COVID-19 treatment,
“compared to 32 percent of white respondents.”83 The fear of
healthcare costs exposes the weakness of the current system and
necessitates reform.

income-and-communities-of-color-at-higher-risk-of-serious-illness-if-infectedwith-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/E43S-BL5R].
79. COVID-19 Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronav
irus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-ra
ce-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/7SDS-77LX].
80. See CDC, WEEK 26, COVID VIEW: A WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE SUMMARY
OF U.S. COVID-19 ACTIVITY, 9–11 (June 27, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronav
irus/2019-ncov/covid-data/pdf/covidview-07-03-2020.pdf?utm_source=link_new
sv9&utm_campaign=item_316052&utm_medium=copy [https://perma.cc/D54Y
-6NWL] (collating increased rate of hospitalization among racial minorities
with statistics on underlying medical conditions in hospitalized adults).
81. Katherine Bagley, Connecting the Dots Between Environmental
Injustice and the Coronavirus, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 7, 2020), https://e360.yale
.edu/features/connecting-the-dots-between-environmental-injustice-and-the-co
ronavirus [https://perma.cc/7GX6-EXHM].
82. Sherita Hill Golden, Coronavirus in African Americans and Other
People of Color, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.hopkinsmed
icine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/covid19-racial-disparities
[https://perma.cc/BR8J-24E3].
83. Sara Heath, More Non-White Patients Dread Out-of-Pocket Costs for
COVID-19, PATIENT ENGAGEMENT HIT (Aug. 4, 2020), https://patientengageme
nthit.com/news/more-non-white-patients-dread-out-of-pocket-costs-for-covid-1
9 [https://perma.cc/9XBP-M3R4].
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B. FRAGMENTED AUTHORITIES
Fragmentations in authorities have caused another
structural problem that impeded successful management of
COVID-19. Successful control of the pandemic requires
regulating individual conduct, such as the enforcement of stayat-home orders to reduce physical contact and buy time for the
government to make preparations, social distancing to slow the
spread of the disease, and face covering to protect the public from
the virus.84 Although the United States federal system splits
authorities that enforce these measures among federal, state,
and local governments to create checks and balances, in the
current pandemic, the system has created fragmentations and
clashes among authorities, resulting in a lack of effective and
coordinated response to the pandemic,85 which, in turn,
contributed to the government’s ultimate failure to control the
disease.86 This section examines government authorities on
regulation of individual conduct and analyzes issues created by
lack of coordination and subsequent conflicts among them.
At the federal level, the government has the authority to
impose quarantine and isolation, drawn from the Commerce
Clause in the United States Constitution.87 Under Section 361
of the PHSA, the Secretary of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS Secretary”) has the
authority to take measures to prevent the entry and spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United
84. See Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal,
State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO
COVID-19, supra note 3, at 15 (cataloguing various measures taken to control
the pandemic).
85. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 32, 35–38
(observing that “[f]ederalism further divides authority for legal interventions in
the pandemic response among federal, state, and local governments”).
86. See id. at 35 (“[T]he federal government shunted to states responsibility
that they neither asked for nor could bear—functionally or financially.”).
87. The United States Supreme Court applies a broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause to control activity that has a “substantial economic effect” on
interstate commerce, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124, 125 (1942), or if
the cumulative effect of an act could affect interstate commerce, NLRB. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 38 (1937). See also U.S. v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (“The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states [but also] extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of
the power of Congress over it . . . .”).
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States and among states.88 The authority for performing these
functions on a daily basis has been delegated to the Director of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the
CDC may order the quarantine or isolation of specific
individuals if it suspects infection.89 Although the issuances of
such orders are rare,90 non-compliance is punishable by fines or
imprisonment.91
The statutory powers cited above provide the federal
government with authority to impose travel restrictions. In
January 2020, the President restricted the entry of all aliens
who were physically within China during the preceding fourteen
days.92 As of October 2020, several Presidential proclamations
were in effect, restricting entry into the United States from
China, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Brazil,
Iran, and scores of countries across continental Europe.93
However, there is a controversy as to whether the federal
government has the authority to impose a “national” quarantine;
e.g., whether the federal government may directly place New
88. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2008). Originally, this statute conferred this power on
the Surgeon General, but all statutory powers and functions of the Surgeon
General were subsequently transferred to the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 8855 (June 25,
1966), which became the HHS Secretary. 20 U.S.C. § 3508.
89. 42 C.F.R. §70.6(a) (2017). The CDC control is limited to diseases listed
by President’s executive order. See generally Section II.A infra (outlining federal
and state healthcare frameworks in general and during a pandemic).
90. Cf. Lauren Sloss, Quarantine and Travel: Strict Penalties, Rare
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/2
1/travel/quarantine-enforcement.html.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 271.
92. Proclamation No. 9984 of January 31, 2020, 85 Fed. Reg. 6709 (Jan. 31,
2020) [hereinafter Proclamation 9984]. The President’s travel restriction relies
on immigration laws—§§ 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)—instead of § 361 of the PHSA. Proclamation 9984, at 6710. Compare
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a), and 3 U.S.C. § 301 (INA provisions cited in
Proclamation 9984), with 42 U.S.C. § 264 (PHSA provisions). Professor Polly
Price opines that the President used immigration provisions to circumvent HHS
and CDC involvement and rulemaking, which would be involved if he used
PHSA provisions. Email from Polly J. Price, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of
Law, Professor of Glob. Health, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Jan. 26,
2021, 9:11 PM) (on file with author).
93. Travelers Prohibited from Entry to the United States, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/corona
virus/2019-ncov/travelers/from-other-countries.html [https://perma.cc/2555-L2
3Y].
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York, New Jersey, and Connecticut residents under a
quarantine.94 There is a view that quarantine within a state is
an exclusive state power, not within the federal government’s
authority; i.e., the federal quarantine power is limited to
preventing the spread of communicable diseases into the country
or across state lines.95 Regardless of the legal issue, it would be
politically difficult for the federal government to bypass states
and impose quarantines directly within state territories,96
unless it is abundantly clear that the states in question are
unable to control a massive spread of the pandemic beyond their
state boundaries.
States have the primary authority to enact and enforce
quarantine laws under their police power.97 States may also
declare their own state of emergency,98 under which governors
are authorized to adopt a broad range of public policy measures,
including quarantine and isolation mandates.99 State public
health codes also delegate authority to local governments to
adopt their own measures; for example, the Texas Public Health
and Safety Code provides in part:
The governing body of a municipality or the commissioners court of a
county may enforce any law that is reasonably necessary to protect
94. Brian Naylor, Fact Check: A Blanket National Quarantine Is Likely Not
Legal, NPR (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/02/825293201/a-presid
ent-is-not-able-to-order-a-national-quarantine-experts-say [https://perma.cc/26
YE-G6B3].
95. See Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, The Law and Limits of
Quarantine, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. e28, e28(1)–(2) (2020), https://www.nejm.or
g/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp2004211?articleTools=true [https://perma.cc/8M2F-A
37F].
96. See Scott McDonald, NY Governor Cuomo Says a Federal Quarantine
by Trump Would be a ’Declaration of War,’ Trump Renegotiates, NEWSWEEK
(Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/ny-governor-cuomo-says-federal-q
uarantine-ordered-trump-would-declaration-war-states-1494857 [https://perm
a.cc/7DLL-4BPC] (describing tension between President Trump and Governor
Cuomo over a potential federal quarantine of New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut).
97. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902).
98. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Georgia, Kemp Declares Public Health
State of Emergency (Mar. 16, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020
-03-16/kemp-declares-public-health-state-emergency [https://perma.cc/7MZBUFS7].
99. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202 (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.governo
r.ny.gov/news/no-202-declaring-disaster-emergency-state-new-york [https://per
ma.cc/ML5J-3KBD].

22

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

the public health . . . . The governing bodies of municipalities and the
commissioners courts of counties may cooperate with one another in
making necessary improvements and providing services to promote
the public health . . . .100

Split authority among federal, state, and local governments
has raised controversies as to the legitimacy of the proposed and
implemented government measures. Toward the end of March,
when the pandemic was fast spreading in the Northeast United
States, former President Trump reportedly discussed the
possibility of a federal quarantine in the tri-state area of New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.101 State governors resisted
the idea, as well reflected by the New York State Governor’s
comment that “[the imposition of the federal quarantine] would
be a declaration of war on states. A federal declaration of war.”102
Polly J. Price, an expert in health law and Professor of Law at
Emory Law School, also opined that quarantine within a state is
exclusively within the states’ power, where the quarantine does
not involve entry into the country or cross-state movement but
requires people to stay home or close business.103 The question
is whether the federal government’s quarantines within state
territories will qualify as measures to prevent the entry and
spread of communicable diseases “from foreign countries into the
States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any
other State or possession.”104 The quarantines in question do not
specifically target movements across the state borders and,
therefore, are arguably outside the ambit of the law, despite the
CDC’s statement that the federal government has quarantine
powers.105
There have also been disputes between state and local
(municipal) authorities over the regulation of public conduct,
such as face-covering requirements. The Governor of Georgia, for
example, clashed with the Mayor of Atlanta regarding the
Mayor’s enactment of a mask mandate in the city. Under the
mask mandate proposed by the Mayor of Atlanta, failure to wear

100. 2 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §121.003 (West 2015).
101. McDonald, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. See Polly J. Price, Do State Lines Make Public Health Emergencies
Worse? Federal Versus State Control of Quarantine, 67 EMORY L. J. 491 (2018).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2018) (emphasis added).
105. Naylor, supra note 94.
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a mask within Atlanta’s city limits was punishable by a fine and
up to six months in jail.106 The Governor claimed that “the
mayor’s [sic] mask mandate violated his emergency order
prohibiting local action from being more prohibitive than the
state’s requirements.”107 This dispute led to the Governor filing
a lawsuit against the City of Atlanta and the Mayor, although
he subsequently dropped the lawsuit.108 Conversely, the
Governor of Nevada criticized and objected to the Mayor of Las
Vegas re-opening casinos in late April when he and many of his
supporters did not consider the City of Las Vegas to be ready for
re-opening in the pandemic.109
In a democracy, disagreements among authorities may
emerge, and these types of checks and balances among the
different layers of government are embedded in the Constitution
and may well be justified during normal times; however, in this
unprecedented pandemic, the disputes and clashes among
federal, state, and local authorities confuse the public and
undermine public confidence in the government’s control of the
disease. The fragmentations between authorities could not have
been conducive to ensuring a consistent and effective response
to COVID-19 across the country. In the absence of strong federal
leadership in the management of the current pandemic, federal,
state, and local authorities lack coordination, leaving each state
to deal with the pandemic largely on their own.110 The lack of
precedents in a comparable-scale pandemic in recent decades

106. Atl., Ga. Exec. Order No. 2020-113.
107. Devin Cole, Georgia Governor Withdraws Lawsuit Challenging Atlanta
Mayor’s Mask Mandate, CNN (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/08/13/politics/brian-kemp-atlanta-mask-lawsuit-withdrawing/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3QNL-WX5Q].
108. Nicholas Reimann, Georgia Governor Drops Lawsuit Against Atlanta
Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms Over Mask Mandate, FORBES (Aug. 13. 2020, 3:46
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/08/13/ga-governor-dr
ops-lawsuit-against-atlanta-mayor-keisha-lance-bottoms-over-mask-mandate
/#6f212a167d2a [https://perma.cc/5N3X-FC3V].
109. Allyson Chiu, The Public Skewering of Las Vegas Mayor Carolyn
Goodman, Champion of Reopening Casinos, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/04/23/las-vegas-mayor-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/6XPP-WPS9].
110. Michael D. Shear et al., Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush to Abandon
Leadership Role on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18
/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-response-failure-leadership.html [https://perma
.cc/LXL9-PFLW] (last updated Sept. 15, 2020).
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may have affected the poor coordination and low level of
institutional readiness for the pandemic. To overcome the
present fragmentation in authority, consideration should be
given to a new institutional arrangement, such as a control
center in charge of pandemic management, as discussed in
Section III.A below.
C. PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Lastly, the third impediment in the management of COVID19 has been insufficient public access to information. Ensuring
public access to information is considered to be a necessary
response to the pandemic.111 The public will be made better
aware of the situation and will be in a better position to protect
themselves from the disease when they are granted unfettered
access to necessary information, including: the status of the
disease (e.g., the number and locations of infections and deaths);
government response measures (e.g., stay-at-home orders, social
distancing requirements, and mask-wearing mandates); public
safety guidelines (e.g., hygiene recommendations); and
availability of test sites, treatment, and vaccination.112 Some of
the information acquired through contact tracing, such as the
locations and dates of the visits by those infected, is also useful
to the public in their efforts to assess the risk of exposure in their
daily lives, particularly in the early stages of a pandemic where
the number of infections is relatively limited.
Public access to information will strengthen the ability of
the public to combat the disease and improve their chances for
survival through the pandemic. Ensuring public access to
information will also enable the public to better understand the
government’s decisions related to the pandemic, evaluate and
debate the decision-making process, and propose improvements
to the decisions. This process builds collaboration and trust
between the government and the public, which is essential to
effectively responding to a pandemic.113 The right to information
enhances public access to it; this right, which will be examined
111. Ensuring the Public’s Right to Know in the COVID-19 Pandemic,
ARTICLE 19, at 4 (May 2020), https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/202
0/05/Ensuring-the-Publics-Right-to-Know-in-the-Covid-19-Pandemic_Final-13
.05.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU3G-A5XS].
112. Id.
113. Id.
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further, is particularly beneficial in enabling medical experts,
academics, and journalists to obtain the necessary information
to inform the general public and advise the government to
consider better alternatives.
In the United States, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and its state equivalents114 facilitate the right to
information. The right to information is also a fundamental
component of the right to freedom of expression, as articulated
by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.115 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has specified that
states should proactively publish information of public interest
and take steps to facilitate access to information held by public
bodies by, inter alia, legislating freedom of information
legislation.116 The United States federal and state FOIA models
meet the latter recommendation, but the former part—proactive
publication of information—is not generally required under
federal or state laws.117 There is a need for the legal protection
of this part of the right, which can be accomplished by requiring
the government under the law to release the information about
the pandemic promptly.
The right to information can conflict with the right to
privacy, particularly when the former extends to private
information of individuals, such as information on the locations
where infection cases are reported and the time and location of
visits made by those infected with the virus in a recent time
period. This information, which is obtained through contact
tracing, would be important to contain the pandemic, as such
information enables the public to take precautionary action. The
information required through contact tracing, however, is
private in nature, and any attempt to obtain such information,
either by the government or the public, raises a privacy
114. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); see also GA.
CODE. ANN. § 31-7-6 (2010); N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW §§ 91–99 (McKinney
2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.17(B)(4) (West 2004).
115. G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 19; and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), art. 19.
116. General Comment No. 34, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. on its 102nd
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www2.ohchr.org/englis
h/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK8G-4D2H].
117. 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3 (2018).
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concern118: while the public needs to secure necessary
information to combat the disease, the individual subject to
contact tracing may not wish to provide private information to
the government or to permit any part of the information to be
released to the public. In a recent survey, most participants
showed objection to publicly releasing contact tracing
information.119 Reflecting this popular concern, contact tracing
information is not released to the public in the United States. In
several states, including Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Louisiana, bills have been introduced to ensure
privacy and confidentiality for contact tracing and make
participation voluntary, not mandatory.120
The pro-privacy stance, currently taken by local legislatures
and the general population,121 stems, at least in part, from the
concern about the potential misuse of collected information.
Such potential misuse would consist of any use of collected
information for an unauthorized purpose. For example, a public
release of private information obtained through contact tracing,
such as an individual’s personal address, would be a misuse;
another example of misuse would be the unauthorized use of
contact tracing information by a third party, who may, for
example, gain access to the information to develop an exposure
tracing and notification app for the government, to learn the

118. Congressional Research Service (CRS) has addressed the privacy issue
in the context of digital contact tracing. ERIC N. HOLMES & CHRIS D.
LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10511, COVID-19: DIGITAL CONTACT
TRACING AND PRIVACY LAW (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf
/LSB/LSB10511 [https://perma.cc/U3EE-YQNF]. In response to the privacy
concern, the HIPAA provides for the protection of medical records and other
personal health information and prevents disclosure without patient
authorization. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160(A)–(E) (2020); and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2020). The
HIPAA also authorizes the release of personal medical information under
emergency situations. See discussion infra Section II.B.
119. LUCY SIMKO ET AL., COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING AND PRIVACY:
STUDYING OPINION AND PREFERENCES 11 (May 8, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2
005.06056.pdf [https://perma.cc/98C8-KZJZ].
120. Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, State and Territorial Contact
Tracing Legislation, ISSUE BRIEF (July 2, 2020), https://www.astho.org/COVID19/State-and-Territorial-Contact-Tracing-Legislation/ [https://perma.cc/VW6TQYH4].
121. Id.; see also SIMKO ET AL., supra note 119 (discussing public concerns
between the need for technology-based contact tracing and maintaining
privacy).
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pattern of customer movements for a commercial purpose.122 The
government use of contact tracing information for a purpose
unrelated to the pandemic, such as to trace criminal suspects,
enforcing immigration rules, and monitoring national security
threats, could also be considered a misuse, despite the collateral
benefits to the public.123
Privacy rules embedded in existing federal and state laws
and the new state bills seeking to strengthen the protection of
privacy in the process of contact tracing124 will attempt to
prevent such misuses, but the possibility of misuse cannot be
eliminated by legal prescriptions alone. An external security
breach is always a possibility; thus, security measures, such as
a physical separation of the database that stores contact tracing
information, might be necessary to reduce the possibility of a
breach and potential misuse. Additional preventive measures
may also be adopted to ensure the integrity of the process; for
example, consideration should also be given to minimizing a line
of reporting for the investigators who perform contact tracing
and process contact tracing information, thereby minimizing the
number of people who access the information. Contact tracing
should also be subject to independent oversight and periodic
reviews to ensure the protection of confidentiality and privacy in
the process of contact tracing and the use of the information.
Digital contact tracing, which instills anonymity in the collection
of information and notification of exposure, may also reduce the

122. Some states are using digital contact tracing technology created by IT
companies such as Google and Apple, which relies on smartphones using
Bluetooth to determine when devices are in close proximity. Robert A. Fahey &
Airo Hino, COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on Data-Focused
Public Health Responses, 55 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 1 (Dec. 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7328565/ [https://perma.cc/SD7
J-BTDF]. While this approach seeks to protect privacy, it is still subject to
misuse. Id. at 2–3.
123. Thus, the New York State Legislature has passed companion bills
A10500 and S8450C that would require that all information collected by
COVID-19 contact tracers remain confidential and inaccessible to law
enforcement without a court order. Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials,
supra note 120. See also Assembly Bill A10500C, N.Y. STATE SENATE,
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/a10500/amendment/c [https://p
erma.cc/V8UT-NWZ5]; Senate Bill S8450C, N.Y. STATE SENATE, ht
tps://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s8450 [https://perma.cc/N5QH-3
R4E].
124. Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, supra note 120.
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possibility of misuse, although this technology also does not
eliminate the privacy concerns.125
There is a conflict between the right to information and the
right to privacy in a pandemic situation, where the information
sought pertains to individual privacy. In a pandemic, the society
has to decide whether it is ready to accept certain limitations on
privacy, along with the risk of misuse, by allowing the
government to obtain personal information and use it in the
interest of controlling the pandemic.126 The question is the
extent of acceptable limitations on privacy and of allowable use
by the government. The point of balance may vary by public
preferences, social traditions, and cultural aspirations. In the
United States, individualism prevailing in society has generated
a strong preference for privacy, resulting in no public release of
contact tracing information and the pro-privacy stance in contact
tracing legislation.127 Participation in contact tracing is also
made voluntary rather than mandatory.128 Considering the large
number of infections and continuing deaths from COVID-19,
efforts should be made to increase public access to information,
including some of the information acquired by contact tracing
while seeking to protect essential privacy (such as personal
125. See HOLMES & LINEBAUGH, supra note 118 (discussing privacy issues
in digital contact tracing). The concern about misuse is well reflected by the
recent remarks of Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri, who opined that
“Americans are right to be skeptical of this project . . . . Too often, Americans
have been burned by companies who calculated that the profits they could gain
by reversing privacy pledges would outweigh any later financial penalty.” Evan
Halper, Lawmakers Warn Coronavirus Contact-Tracing is Ripe for Abusive
Surveillance, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story
/2020-04-26/privacy-americans-trade-off-trace-coronavirus-contacts.
126. Yong-Shik Lee & Hye Seong Mun, COVID-19: Public Access to
Information – Legal and Institutional Frameworks, 13 L. DEV. REV. 535, 539
(2020).
127. See Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, supra note 120. For
example, New York bill S8327 would make it unlawful to knowingly
disseminate contact tracing information to an unauthorized person. Id. A New
Jersey bill, A 4170, for another example, would limit the use of contact tracing
data to contact tracing purposes and require the collected data to be deleted no
later than 30 days after it is received. Id.
128. Id. See also Contact Tracing Resources for Health Departments, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-n
cov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-resources.html [https://perma.cc/GX3W
-X9GG] [hereinafter Contact Tracing Resources for Health Departments] (last
updated Sept. 1, 2020), (recommending voluntary, rather than mandatory,
participation in contact tracing).
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identities and addresses). The digital exposure notification apps
currently used in the United States provide the subscribers with
exposure alerts, but they have limits in that they do not provide
the public with necessary information, such as time and location
of visits made by those infected with COVID-19.129
As seen in the preceding discussions, the structural flaws in
healthcare provision in the United States, fragmented
authorities in the regulation of public conduct (to prevent the
spread of the disease), and insufficient public access to
information impeded an effective response to the pandemic.
These flaws necessitate a systemic reform, such as legal and
institutional adjustments. An assessment of the current legal
and institutional apparatus would be a necessary next step to
identify the specific areas for reform. The following discussions
examine the legal and institutional frameworks for healthcare
(as applied to the pandemic) and public access to information for
this purpose.
II. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL APPARATUS
The regulatory gaps in the current legal and institutional
frameworks, such as lack of the mandatory provisions requiring
the government to ensure timely access to TCQT or public access
to information and lack of a politically-independent control
center in charge of the pandemic management, have impeded
pandemic management and require reform. Based on the
examination of the current frameworks, Section III.A will
propose specific legal and institutional reform.
A. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HEALTHCARE
1. Law
In the United States, regulatory power over healthcare is
shared among federal, state, and local governments.130 At the
129. Several other countries that have successfully managed COVID-19,
such as South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, have also collected and
released the tracing information to the public, with details of the released
information determined by pre-set guidelines. Mi Jung Park, COVID-19
Tracing Investigation and Privacy, South Korea, 2020, BRIC VIEW STATUS REP.
(2020).
130. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting
Locally – The U.S. Response to Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2020; e75,
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federal level, statutes such as the ACA,131 the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),132 and the Social
Security Act,133 include operative provisions for healthcare in
the United States. As discussed above, the ACA overhauled the
United States healthcare system by removing some of the
barriers to obtaining health insurance, such as pre-existing
condition exclusions, and creating the government-sponsored
Marketplace.134 The framers of the ACA also sought to expand
Medicaid to increase coverage.135 The HIPAA provides, inter
alia, the ability to transfer and continue health insurance
coverage for American workers and their families when they
change or lose jobs and also requires confidential handling of
protected health information.136 The Social Security Act and its
amendments provide for public coverages such as Medicare (for
those over sixty-five years old and certain people with
disabilities), Medicaid (for low-income individuals and families),
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP, for
children in low-income families not qualified for Medicaid).137
The absence of a universal healthcare system means that a large
number of individuals without insurance (29.3 million as of
2019)138 are not covered for medical treatment, except in
emergencies: the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA) requires hospitals that participate in Medicare
(about 98 percent of hospitals in the United States) to provide
emergency care, regardless of the individual’s insured status or

e75(1) (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp2006740?articleTo
ols=true [https://perma.cc/BBE9-7V9G].
131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq.
(2018).
132. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2018).
133. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2018).
134. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 95–96.
135. Id. at 95.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2018); 42 U.S.C. 1320d–6 (2018).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2018); 42 U.S.C. 1397aa
(2018).
138. Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 49.
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ability to pay.139,140 Under the PHSA, the federal government
also has a general mandate to assist states and local authorities
in the prevention and suppression of communicable diseases and
concerning other public health matters.141 Under the Commerce
Clause authority, the federal government has authority for
prevention and control of disease at the borders or interstate.142
At the state level, laws grant state governments plenary
authority concerning healthcare administration (to the extent
that the authority is not preempted by federal law).143 Thus,
laws reflect healthcare policy adopted by each state and regulate
both public and private provision of healthcare through a variety
of statutory mechanisms. For example, state laws regulate the
professional practice of healthcare by requiring that all
providers first obtain a license or permit before rendering
medical service.144 State laws also provide for much of the
funding to healthcare providers necessary for the operation of

139. The EMTALA extends its treatment mandate to patients presenting
with an “emergency medical condition,” as determined by an initial medical
screening examination. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018). The EMTALA allows the
determination to be made “within the capability of the hospital’s emergency
department.” Id. Once the hospital staff determines a patient has a legitimate
emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either the appropriate
examination and treatment within the capability of “the staff and facilities
available at the hospital” to stabilize the patient’s condition, or transfer to
another medical facility under limited conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)
(2018).
140. On March 9, 2020, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
issued a memorandum reaffirming hospitals’ obligation to provide access to
emergency medical care for all those in need, including and especially patients
suspected of infection. EMTALA Requirements, supra note 67. Under CMS’s
guidance, emergency departments (EDs) may not “use signage that presents
barriers to individuals who are suspected of COVID-19 from coming to the ED,”
or “refuse to provide an appropriate [medical screening exam] to anyone who
has come to the ED for examination or treatment of a medical condition.” Id. at
5. When individuals are deemed infected, hospitals are expected to “isolate the
patient immediately.” Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. §243(a) (2018).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
143. Eileen Salinksy, Governmental Public Health: An Overview of State and
Local Public Health Agencies, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, Paper 244 (Aug.
18, 2010), https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_centers_nhpf/244/.
144. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1253 (1996); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-7-3; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-301 (2020); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE § 3605
(2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE § 2801-a (2019).
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medical facilities.145 Finally, state statutes provide for a
comprehensive scheme for governmental oversight of healthcare
facilities, personnel, and services.146
At the local level, laws regulate healthcare only to the extent
allowed by states, which have primary authority over
healthcare.147 Thus, local laws are generally limited to the
implementation and enforcement of state mandates on
healthcare.148 For these reasons, there exists significant
variation among local jurisdictions with respect to the scope of
laws governing healthcare. In the realm of public health, local
laws do, however, play a significant role in the public health code
enforcement process by establishing within local governmental
agencies powers of inspection, investigation, and adjudication of
particular offenses.149 Local laws may impose recordkeeping and
information-reporting
requirements
upon
healthcare
providers,150 which state and federal officials may then compile
to better inform their public health policy decisions.
During periods of a public health crisis, the following
statutes empower the federal government to adopt emergency
measures: the PHSA, the Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act), and the National
Emergencies Act (the NEA).151 The PHSA serves as the primary

145. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-1 (2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE §
2807-k (2020). Such funding is especially important for privately owned
providers, which might not otherwise be able to afford to treat their indigent
patients.
146. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-2.1 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1852
(2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1854 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 250.03 (2009).
147. Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 65; see, e.g., ATLANTA,
GA., MUN. CODE § 5-1 (2020).
148. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2433
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 16-2-11 (2020).
149. See Cook County, Ill. § 38-32 (2020); Fulton County, Ga. § 34-2 (2020);
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY. § 11-7 (2020); CHARLESTON, W. VA. § 58-1
(2020).
150. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY. § 11-7 (2020); PORTLAND, OR. §
8.24.070 (2020).
151. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300mm–61 (2018); Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et
seq. (2018); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2018). See also
Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and
Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19,
supra note 3, at 10.
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legal instrument for public health crises.152 Section 319 of the
PHSA vests in the HHS Secretary broad legal authority to
respond to such crises, including the powers to declare a public
health emergency (PHE).153 Declaration of a PHE under the
PHSA triggers multiple mechanisms in federal law by which
public health officials can exercise broader discretion to
effectively respond to the emergency. For example, Section 319
of the PHSA empowers the HHS Secretary to make grants,
provide awards for expenses, enter into contracts, and conduct
and support investigations into the cause, treatment, or
prevention of the disease or disorder.154
The Stafford Act addresses several issues relating to
disaster preparedness and response155 by ensuring an “orderly
and continuing means of assistance” from federal to state and
local governments.156 As for public health, the Stafford Act
authorizes the President to provide technical and advisory
assistance to affected state and local governments for public
health and safety information, including dissemination of such
information, provision of health and safety measures, and
management, control, and reduction of immediate threats to
public health and safety.157 The Act also authorizes the
President to direct any federal agency to utilize its authorities
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300mm–61 (2018); U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Legal Authority, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, https://www.phe
.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/T99
P-R5EH] (last reviewed Sept. 18, 2019).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2018).
154. Id. Under Section 1135 of the Social Security Act, the HHS Secretary is
authorized during a PHE to waive or modify certain Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP,
and HIPAA requirements to “ensure that sufficient health care services and
providers are available during an emergency.” Nicole Huberfeld & Sidney
Watson, Medicaid’s Vital Role in Addressing Health and Economic
Emergencies, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at
105; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2018).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2018). Issues posed by disasters include loss of life,
human suffering, loss of income, property loss and damage, and interruption of
normal governmental functions and communities. Id.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2018). To achieve this primary objective, the
Stafford Act empowers the federal government to i) revise and broaden the
scope of existing disaster relief programs, ii) encourage state and local
development of comprehensive disaster preparedness plans and hazard
mitigation efforts, iii) facilitate increased intergovernmental coordination, and
iv) provide economic assistance for disaster-related losses. Id.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(3) (2018).
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and resources (including personnel, equipment, supplies,
facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in
support of state and local emergency assistance efforts to protect
public health.158 The Act further imposes a duty upon the HHS
Secretary to “set priorities and preparedness goals and further
develop a coordinated strategy” to improve state, local, and
hospital preparedness for and response to public health
threats.159
Recognizing the need for broader executive power during
times of emergency, Congress enacted the NEA in 1976.160 The
NEA empowers the President to declare a national
emergency.161 Declaration of a national emergency under the
NEA triggers latent emergency powers vested in the President
by other statutes.162 For example, the President is authorized to
waive confidentiality and certification requirements, sanctions,
and other provisions as necessary to supply public health
services.163 The President may also utilize the Public Health
Service to the extent he deems necessary to “promote the public
interest.”164 The NEA prescribes procedural safeguards: the
President is required to specify existing statutory authority from
which he derives his emergency power.165 Additionally, the NEA
imposes reporting requirements upon the President to ensure

158. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(1) (2018).
159. 6 U.S.C. § 321g(a) (2018).
160. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2018).
161. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2018).
162. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2018).
163. Social Security Act of 1935 § 1135, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2018).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 217 (2018). See Brennan Center for Justice, A Guide to
Emergency Powers and Their Use (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.o
rg/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use [https://p
erma.cc/2HTC-3C4F].
165. 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2018). For example, the President specifically invoked
Section 1135 of the Social Security Act when he directed HHS Secretary Azar
to “waive or modify certain requirements of the Medicare, Medicaid, and State
Children’s Health Insurance programs and of the [HIPAA] Privacy Rule.”
Proclamation 9994, 85 FED. REG. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020).
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accountability.166 Congress may also terminate a President’s
declaration of emergency by passing a joint resolution.167
Under significant pressure to combat the rapid spread of
COVID-19, Congress enacted additional statutes, including the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA)168 and the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES
Act).169 The FFCRA mandated that health insurers provide
coverage and not impose any cost-sharing requirements
(including deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance) or prior
authorization or other medical management requirements for
diagnostic COVID-19 testing and vaccination.170 The CARES Act
also appropriated $1.3 billion in supplemental awards to
healthcare providers to alleviate some of the financial burden
associated with COVID-19.171 However, neither the FFCRA nor
the CARES Act specifically requires healthcare providers to
cover the cost of treatment. Rather, these legislative efforts seek
to broaden access to healthcare services by removing financial
barriers to testing for patients and by dispensing over $1 billion
in federal funding to healthcare providers, thus increasing their
capabilities as it relates to the “prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of COVID-19.”172
State laws also empower state governors to respond to
public health emergencies with heightened authorities;173 under
broadly drafted state laws, governors may exercise the power to
“enforce all laws, rules, and regulations relating to emergency
166. 50 U.S.C. § 1641 (2018). These reporting requirements include
maintaining a file and index of all significant orders of the President,
maintaining a file and index of all executive agencies’ emergency rules and
regulations, transmitting to Congress all such orders, rules, and regulations,
and transmitting to Congress relevant expenditure reports. Id.
167. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(1).
168. FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.)
(2020).
169. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 9001–9141).
170. FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 6001 - 6004, 134 Stat. 178, 201—207
(2020) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3)).
171. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 § 3211, 134 Stat. 281, 368 (2020)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 254b(r)).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 254b(r)(6) (2020).
173. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8565–8574 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-351(d)(4.1) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
418.011 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.015 (2020).
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management and to assume direct operational control of all civil
forces and helpers in the state . . . .”174 State law also enumerates
specific, additional emergency powers granted to the governor,
such as the power to mandate that healthcare facilities provide
services to individuals in need.175 State departments of public
health assist their respective governors in public health
administration.176 State law generally charges state
departments of public health with developing rules and
regulations “appropriate for management of any public health
emergency . . . .”177 As with the federal laws discussed above,
state laws do not impose any specific requirement on governors
to provide timely public access to TCQT, which, in the state
context, would be challenging due to limited capacities.
2. Legal Institutions
The primary federal institutions charged with COVID-19
response are the HHS and its ancillary agency, the CDC, both of
which operate under the President’s administrative authority.
The HHS develops policies on healthcare, and the CDC is a
research-based agency that provides data and recommends
guidelines to healthcare providers, state and local public health
officials, private entities, and schools.178 The CDC is tasked with

174. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51(c)(1) (2020). Similarly, Michigan state law
states that the governor “is responsible for coping with dangers to this state or
the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency.” MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 30.403 (2020). As another example, Texas state law charges the
governor with meeting “the dangers to the state and people presented by
disasters . . . .” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.011 (2020).
175. Georgia state law explicitly grants the governor the power to “[c]ompel
a health care facility to provide services or the use of its facility if such services
or use are reasonable and necessary for emergency response.” GA. CODE ANN. §
38-3-51(d)(4.1) (2020). California, Texas, and West Virginia also statutorily
authorize the state’s governor to commandeer private property or personnel if
the governor determines such action is necessary for effective emergency
response. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8572 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.017
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 15-5-6(c)(3) (2020).
176. Peter D. Jacobson et al., Executive Decision Making for COVID-19:
Public Health Science Through a Political Lens, in ASSESSING LEGAL
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 58.
177. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2.1(b) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2453
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 16-1-6(b) (2020).
178. Sarah H. Gordon et al., What Federalism Means for the US Response to
Coronavirus Disease 2019, JAMA HEALTH FORUM (May 8, 2020), https://jaman
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“[m]onitoring and assessing viruses and illnesses[,]” “[b]uilding
and supporting surveillance and response capacity[,]”
“[i]mproving vaccines and other interventions[,]” and “[a]pplying
research to provide science-based enhancement of prevention
and control policies and programs.”179 Despite these mandates,
federal institutions have shown limited effectiveness in
containing the spread of COVID-19, delegating primary
decision-making responsibilities to state and local officials.180
At the state level, state departments of public health are the
primary institutions in charge of COVID-19 management; they
develop rules and regulations relating to public health
emergency response and monitor and enforce its operations.181
In the absence of federal leadership, state departments of public
health and governors’ offices have assumed primary
responsibility for developing policies as well as for adopting and
enforcing relevant measures to combat COVID-19, such as
public testing. The state departments coordinate with local
health departments across their respective states and have
authority to “monitor the administration, operation and
coordination of the local boards of health and local health
officer . . . .”182 State departments of health have an important
role in promoting consistency among public health outcomes,
with the legal authority to oversee and even preempt local public
health administration. 183
Without organized support from the federal government or
nationwide coordination, state institutions, limited by resource
constraints, have not been successful in containing COVID-19.
As further discussed in Section III.A, the current institutional

etwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2766033 [https://perma.cc/FBD7Q7YW].
179. What CDC Does, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://w
ww.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/what-cdc-does.htm
[https://perma.cc/9HZP-FM23] (last visited Dec. 9, 2020).
180. Peter D. Jacobson et al., Executive Decision Making for COVID-19:
Public Health Science Through a Political Lens, in ASSESSING LEGAL
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 60.
181. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2.1(b) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2453
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 16-1-6(b) (2020).
182. W. VA. CODE § 16-1-6(e) (2020).
183. Kim Haddow et al., Preemption, Public Health, and Equity in the Time
of COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at
74.
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framework is not effective in pandemic management, and there
is a need for a new, reinforced institutional framework, such as
a politically-independent national control center in the
management of the pandemic, which will not be inhibited by
partisan politics or resource constraints experienced by the
current state institutions.
B. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PUBLIC
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Public access to information is another area in which legal
and institutional frameworks affect pandemic management and
requires a review in this context. The federal, state, and local
governments are under broad legal mandates to collect and
release information to the public,184 albeit subject to the
limitations posed by the requirements of privacy and
confidentiality.185 At the federal level, the PHSA requires the
HHS Secretary to formulate a national strategy for promoting
health information and to undertake the necessary actions to
improve health knowledge in American society.186 The HHS
Secretary is also empowered to conduct and support activities
promoting public health information and promotion, including
the publication of materials to be distributed to the public which
instruct individuals on how to improve and safeguard their
health.187 However, this provision does not contain an express
184. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting a legal mandate to the federal
government); U.S. CONST. amend. X (granting broad police power to state
governments). State law governs the authorities of local government. See Bond
v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 848 (2014) (“Because our constitutional
structure leaves local criminal activity primarily to the States, we have
generally declined to read federal law as intruding on that responsibility, unless
Congress has clearly indicated that the law should have such reach.”).
185. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2020); 45 C.F.R. pt. 46; 42 U.S.C. §§ 241(d),
242m(d) (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); 45 C.F.R. pt. 5b.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 300u (2018). These activities include supporting the
development of health education and providing technical assistance for health
education. Id. The Secretary is also required to establish the Office of Disease
Prevention and Health Promotion, which is responsible for coordinating health
promotion activities in the government and the private sector and establishing
a national information clearinghouse to facilitate the exchange and
dissemination of health information. Id.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3 (2018). When carrying out these publication
activities, the Secretary is required to make the published information
accessible to populations of different social and economic backgrounds, and
populations that speak other languages. See 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3(1).
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standard for when the Secretary is obligated to carry out such
publication activities; it simply provides that the Secretary is
“authorized to conduct or support . . . such activities as may be
required to make information . . . available to consumers of
medical care, providers of such care, schools, and others who
should be informed respecting such matters.”188
Additional statutory devices, such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),189 control the collection and
release of information at the federal level. Under the HIPAA,
covered entities, such as hospitals, may disclose protected health
information to public health authorities authorized by law to
collect or receive such information to prevent or control
disease190 and also to individuals who may have contracted or
been exposed to a communicable disease.191 The HIPAA also
authorizes covered entities to disclose protected health
information that they believe is necessary to prevent or lessen a
serious and imminent threat to a person or the public, when such
disclosure is made to someone they believe can prevent or lessen
the threat.192 The FOIA compels the government to release
requested information unless it is protected under stipulated
exceptions, but this release generally necessitates an affirmative
request by a member of the public per the pre-set procedure.193
At the state and local levels, every state has laws and
regulations that mandate the reporting of the occurrence of
diseases and conditions, prescribe the timing and nature of the
information to be reported, 194 and stipulate the penalties for
non-compliance.195 States have varied disease reporting
systems: some states authorize the health commissioner or state
boards to create, monitor, and revise the list of reportable

188. 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3 (emphasis added).
189. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. (2018).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2021).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A)–(B).
193. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b).
194. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1 (West 2020); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-12-2 (2020); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2101 (McKinney 2020).
195. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1280.4 (West 2020).
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diseases and conditions under general statutory powers,196 and
some other states require reports under both statutes and health
department regulations.197 The mandatory reporting system
enables state authorities to collect information from a range of
professionals and organizations, including physicians, other
healthcare providers, diagnostic laboratories, clinical facilities,
and schools and daycare centers.198 However, the compliance
rates with this reporting requirement, which may affect the
quality of information, vary, ranging from 6 percent to 90
percent for different common infectious conditions.199 This
variance is attributed to the limitations in physicians’
knowledge of reporting requirements and procedures, as well as
the assumption that laboratories have reported cases of
infectious diseases.200 States may release the information
subject to the limitations under their own privacy laws.201 States
also have their own versions of FOIA to compel the state
agencies to release requested information.202 As with the federal
FOIA, its state versions also do not compel state governments to
release information about the pandemic in the absence of a
request by a member of the public.203
As for the institutional framework, the CDC is the primary
institution that collects, compiles, and releases information
pertinent to COVID-19 to the public. It provides updates on the
status of the pandemic, including the number of infection

196. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-2a (2020).
197. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 2.1 (2020).
198. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2101–
2105 (McKinney 2020).
199. James D. Holt et al., The CDC Field Epidemiology Manual: Legal
Considerations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc
.gov/eis/field-epi-manual/chapters/Legal.html#ref12 [https://perma.cc/A7ZL-TB
P5] (last updated Dec. 13, 2018).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-7-6 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.17(B)(4) (2021); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 2020).
202. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–6270.7 (West 2020); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-18-70 et seq. (2021); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 2020).
203. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.17(C).
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cases,204 deaths,205 and vaccinations206 daily, and publishes
relevant guidelines and recommendations, such as personal
hygiene recommendations.207 The CDC also oversees the
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS),
which collects data from public health departments and health
care providers regarding specific diseases that have been
deemed public health priorities.208 The NNDSS has been tasked
with tracking data on COVID-19, and the CDC has been working
with local public health departments to provide information
regarding how to provide relevant data, as well as to provide
technical assistance with reporting.209 The CDC also assists with
contact tracing; while it does not administer a contact tracing
program, it maintains a collection of resources to assist public
health departments with building their own programs.210
State health departments have broad legal mandates to
supervise the work and activities of local health departments,
supervise the reporting and control of the disease, and promote
education in disease prevention.211 State laws authorize the
state health departments to receive mandatory reports from a
wide range of professionals, and this reporting system enables

204. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (charting COVID-19 cumulative
cases).
205. Id. (charting COVID-19 cumulative deaths).
206. COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccination
s [https://perma.cc/3BHW-PWTG] (last updated Dec. 28, 2020).
207. See, e.g., How to Protect Yourself and Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent
-getting-sick/prevention.html [https://perma.cc/2PVE-6LEF] (last updated
Sept. 11, 2020).
208. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/ [https://perma
.cc/4G8U-EBTJ] (last updated Mar. 13, 2019).
209. NNDSS Supports the COVID-19 Response, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/covid-19-response.html
[https://perma.cc/FX35-DKTE] (last updated Aug. 10, 2020).
210. Contact Tracing Resources for Health Departments, supra note 128.
These resources include a series of guidance documents for establishing and
administering contact tracing in several different settings, such as schools and
workplaces, documents that provide standards for evaluating the success of
contact tracing programs, and digital tools for managing cases. Id.
211. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 201 (McKinney 2020).
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the state authorities to secure and release health information.212
State and local health departments maintain websites that
provide the public with information pertinent to the pandemic,
such as the number of tests completed, the location of testing
sites, available financial assistance, industry guidelines, activity
guidance, and access to exposure notification apps in some
localities.213 However, information is scattered across numerous
federal, state, and local health authority portals and websites,
and there is no effective mechanism of coordination among the
authorities to ensure the consistency of information to be
released to the public across the nation.
III. CALL FOR A NEW APPROACH
A. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The preceding examination reveals that the current legal
and institutional frameworks empower the federal and state
governments to adopt measures to respond to health crises and
collect information, but they do not compel the federal or state
governments to ensure public access to TCQTs or release of
information to the public. Under the current system, ensuring
such public access and information release is largely left to the
political discretion of the leadership with an underlying
presumption that political leaders will use the legal mandate
and institutional capacity to respond to the crisis. The conduct
of the former Trump administration demonstrated that this
presumption does not always hold. Moreover, political failures
did not only exist at the federal level but also prevailed at state
and local levels,214 showing that political failure at one level is
not readily remedied by success at other levels.

212. See, e.g., MINN. R. 4605.7050 (2017) (requiring reporting of certain
illnesses and deaths).
213. See, e.g., Tracking COVID-19, CAL., https://covid19.ca.gov/ [https://pe
rma.cc/X6Q8-4MLX] (last updated Oct. 18, 2020); COVID-19 Citywide
Information Portal, N.Y.C., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/coronavirus/index.page
[https://perma.cc/KDM2-JPH6] (last updated Oct. 18, 2020).
214. See German Lopez, Everyone Failed on Covid-19: The US’s Coronavirus
Epidemic Is an American Failure, Not Solely a Trump or Republican One, VOX
(Jan. 2, 2021, 10:58 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22176191/covid-1
9-coronavirus-pandemic-democrats-republicans-trump [https://perma.cc/UH4Y
-VCLS] (detailing the structural issues that impeded the public and states’
ability to act).
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Thus, some describe the failure in COVID-19 management
as a political failure, but the failure is also institutional in
nature, i.e., current laws and institutions have failed to deliver
an effective response to the pandemic. Laws and institutions
that do not effectively operate in a political reality on the ground
are a failure and require reform. Given the recent transition of
power, one may well hope that the adverse political reality
created by the unique behavior of the Trump administration is a
one-off exception, never to be repeated, but in an increasingly
unpredictable political environment today, there is no assurance
against its recurrence. Considering the uncertainty, a better
approach would be to ensure that the laws and institutions stand
better chances for success in an adverse political environment,
should there be a future pandemic. Laws and institutions are not
immune from bad politics and may not guarantee success by
themselves, but in a society where the rule of law prevails, they
can be made more effective, through reform, to guide and even
mandate a better response to a crisis. This section proposes such
a reform.
On the point of reform, several leading scholars and
professionals, such as Gregg Gonsalves, Amy Kapczynski, and
Albert Ko;215 Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna
Levin, and Wendy Parmet;216 Nicolas Terry;217 Amy Kapczynski

215. See Letter from Gregg Gonsalves et. al., Assistant Prof., Yale Sch. Pub.
Health to Mike Pence et. al., Vice-President of the United States (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/final_covid19_letter_from_public_health_and_legal_experts.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2TM73JW] (calling on federal officials to implement the recommendations made and
act urgently to protect the public from the threat of COVID-19).
216. See Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 1–5 (summarizing
some of the Report’s many “specific legal recommendations for the president
and Congress, governors and state legislatures, and mayors and city councilors
across the country”).
217. See Nicolas Terry, COVID-19 and Healthcare Lessons Already Learned,
7 J. L. & BIOSCI. 1, 1–12 (2020) (criticizing the United States’ “healthcare
financing system that reflects individualism rather than solidarity” through the
lens of COVID-19).
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and Gregg Gonsalves;218 Stuti Khemani;219 and Lindsay Wiley,
Elizabeth McCuskey, Matthew Lawrence, and Erin Fuse
Brown,220 have analyzed various causes of the failure in the
pandemic control and made proposals for improvement. These
proposals include: implementing voluntary, rather than
coercive, self-isolation;221 increasing the federal government’s
support to healthcare safety net providers by better targeting
federal emergency provider grants;222 recalibrating the country’s
investments in clinical care versus public health (increasing the
latter);223 launching federally-funded and locally-organized new
jobs programs;224 better using communication to build
legitimacy and trust in public institutions;225 and incrementally
confronting the structural fixtures in law (individualism, fiscal
fragmentation, federalism, and privatization) to construct
health reform.226
In comparison, this article’s proposed remedies, discussed in
detail below, call for a more extensive legal and institutional
reform than most of these suggestions. The extent of the
proposed reform will nevertheless be justified considering the
unprecedented number of infections and deaths from COVID-19

218. See Amy Kapczynski & Gregg Gonsalves, The New Politics of Care, BOS.
REV. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/politics/gregg-gonsalves-amy-kap
czynski-new-politics-care [https ://perma.cc/85EF-JWCD] (advocating for,
among other solutions, a “Community Health Corps.” job program, contact
tracing, and politics of “support and care, not separation and deprivation”).
219. See Stuti Khemani, An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in
Public Institutions in the Time of COVID-19, WBG: RES. & POLICY BRIEFS (May
4, 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33715
/An-Opportunity-to-Build-Legitimacy-and-Trust-in-Public-Institutions-in-theTime-of-COVID-19.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/PP76-793
K] (focusing on strategies for the government to build public trust during the
COVID-19 pandemic).
220. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 4 (“The thesis of
this Article is that decades of reforms failed to prepare the United States for
2020 because health reform has been conceptually and structurally constrained,
so that to transcend these constraints requires nothing short of
reconstruction.”).
221. Kapczynski & Gonsalves, supra note 212, at 4.
222. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 4.
223. Terry, supra note 217, at 11.
224. Kapczynski & Gonsalves, supra note 218.
225. Khemani, supra note 219.
226. Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41.
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and the inability of the current system to address these problems
adequately.
The problem is not lack of legal authority: current federal
and state laws227 provide the federal and state administrations
with ample authority to adopt necessary measures to combat
COVID-19.228 As discussed above, the laws empower the
government and grant discretion, but they do not obligate the
government to adopt necessary measures in a timely fashion. As
the President is not required to take any specific action in
response to a pandemic and as it is left to his or her political
discretion, the President may make a political decision not to
engage fully with the pandemic, but rather to leave it to state
officials who are under more immediate pressure to act, as
former President Trump did in response to COVID-19.229 The
lack of federal engagement has had serious ramifications; the
scale of the current pandemic does not allow effective handling
by individual states, as evidently shown by the failure of
containing COVID-19 despite several state measures in place.
The pandemic is not a crisis that can be handled solely by states,
particularly in preventing transmissions and containing its
spread across the nation, but a national and an international
crisis that requires a full response by the federal government
that has financial, technical, and administrative resources on a
scale that is not available to state governments.
This suggests that relevant laws, such as the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act (limited to COVID-19) or the PHSA
(generally), need to be amended to require the federal
government to ensure public access to vaccination, testing, and
treatment in a timely fashion (i.e. in pre-set timelines).230 As

227. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm-61 (2018);
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121 et seq. (2018); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2018).
228. See also Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the
Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 10.
229. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 3.
230. In addition, the federal government should be required to ensure the
supply of medical equipment: by the time the federal administration began to
take proactive measures, healthcare providers faced a large number of new
patients and shortages of critical medical equipment, including personal
protective equipment (PPE), ventilators and intensive care beds. Eric Lipton et
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discussed above, uncertainty about the out-of-pocket cost
deterred people from getting timely testing and treatment,
particularly in the crucial early weeks of the pandemic.231 The
FFCRA mandates that health insurers cover testing and
vaccination without cost-sharing,232 but the coverage must be
broader (i.e., covering both insured and uninsured individuals),
immediate, and unambiguous in its terms, so that the cost
concern will not impede getting tests in time. This is the first
crucial step to contain the pandemic. As to the cost of treatment,
the FFCRA is silent, and patients may incur a cost under the
terms of their health insurance, and those without insurance
coverage or with insufficient coverage will be discouraged from
seeking medical treatment, which, in turn, will exacerbate the
spread of the disease.
The substantial risk requires the expansion of federal
coverage to include the cost of treatment. The proposed
amendment must clarify that the costs of COVID-19 related
doctor visits, treatment, and medicine will not be billed directly
to any patient so that patients are not deterred from seeking
treatment until the last minute. This does not mean that the
amendment should require the federal government to take up
the entire cost; rather, it requires that the federal government
cover the gaps between the cost and the coverage by insurance
or by any other existing funding so that there is no ambiguity in
coverage or cost concern to the public in seeking treatment.233
The rationale for the suggested federal coverage is to encourage

al., He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure
on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/u
s/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html?action=click&module=RelatedLink
s&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/HVY3-XPSK].
231. See Witters, supra note 61 and accompanying text (reporting that cost
concerns deterred early testing).
232. FFCRA §§ 6001–6004, 42 U.S.C. USC §§ 1320b-5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3)
(2020); CARES Act, §§ 3201, 3203(a), 41 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020).
233. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) runs the
COVID-19 Uninsured Program for qualified COVID-19 related services,
including tests, vaccines, and treatment, but it is the responsibility of the
uninsured patient to confirm whether the healthcare provider participates in
this program, and one may still be responsible for full payment of the bill if the
provider did not submit a bill for COVID-19-related testing, and/or treatment
to the HRSA. COVID-19 Care for Uninsured Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/covid-19-care-uninsured-indi
viduals/index.html [https://perma.cc/8ZFF-P7Q4] (last updated Sept. 15, 2021).
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the public to test and treat promptly, thereby containing the
pandemic and minimizing its adverse socio-economic impact.
The amendment must also enable the government to limit the
maximum amount that providers can charge for the tests and
control the amount the manufacturers charge for COVID-19
medicines and vaccines to eliminate price gouging, price
discrimination, and waste.234 COVID-19 treatment must also be
combined with effective quarantine requirements.
The proposed legal reform should also require the
government to ensure timely contact tracing and isolation of
those infected with COVID-19, including asymptomatic and
mildly symptomatic COVID-19 patients, and their treatment
(i.e., treatment in public facilities isolated from outside physical
contact, such as CTCs). The amendment should also mandate
that individuals who have not tested positive but have been
exposed to the virus, and who have been identified, through
contact tracing, to be at risk of infection, should also be placed
in self-quarantine under monitoring by health authorities.235
Effective contact tracing, quarantine, and isolation would not be
possible without close cooperation and coordination with state
234. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 40. As for COVID19 medicines—such as Veklury (Remdesivir) and Regenerion’s anti-body
cocktail (Casirivimab and Imdevimab)—another proposal calls for an
amendment of the FFCRA to stipulate the responsibility of the federal
government to ensure that i) sufficient amounts of the COVID-19 medicines are
produced and made available to patients, by taking necessary measures,
including granting third-party manufacturers license (i.e., “march-in” rights
under Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. § 203), to increase production and lower
prices; and ii) COVID-19 patients have immediate access to these medicines
without bearing the burden of cost-share obligations, by requiring the federal
government to have a cost-sharing agreement with suppliers, hospitals, and
insurers (but no cost-sharing obligations to the public). Lee & Mun, supra note
126, at 535. The federal government will be required to cover the cost of these
medicines to the extent that is not covered by insurers or the other existing
funds. Id. A commentator also points out that there has been a lack of public
guidance on the ethical distribution of scarce therapeutics, ventilators, ICU
beds, and critical care staff among hospitals and states; when there was a
shortage, those with financial resources and existing connections to the
suppliers acquired them, rather than states, communities, or hospitals with
strongest needs. See Megan Ranney, Valerie Griffith & Ashish Jha, Critical
Supply Shortages — The Need for Ventilators and Personal Protective
Equipment During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 382 N. ENG. J. MED. e41 (2020)
(explaining the causes of the shortages and possible solutions to cure them).
235. In such cases, the cost of mandatory self-quarantine is to be reimbursed
by the government up to a pre-defined limit.
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and local authorities, and the law must prescribe a process by
which such cooperation and coordination among the federal,
state, and local authorities will be implemented.
Insufficient vaccination is another concern. Sufficient
amounts of vaccines have been made available for the public
since the spring of 2021, but as of October 2021, over 40 percent
of the population has not been fully vaccinated.236 There has
been continuing political mistrust among a large segment of the
public about the need for the control of the disease and the
necessity of vaccination despite the on-going pandemic
accompanying large numbers of new infections and deaths on a
daily basis.237 Consideration should be given to possible legal
and institutional approaches that would encourage vaccination,
including linking vaccination to Coronavirus Tax Relief and
Economic Impact Payments that have been offered by the Biden
administration.238 Relevant legislation, such as the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021,239 could be amended to authorize the
government to provide greater amounts of tax relief and
payments, as an incentive, for those who have been vaccinated.
Finally, the amendment should require the government to
promptly release all information necessary to prevent further
spread of the pandemic to the public, including some of the
information obtained through contact tracing, such as the time
and location of recent visits made by those infected with the
disease so that the public may take appropriate precaution.
Federal and state laws regulate how health information may be
collected and released,240 but they generally do not impose an
affirmative requirement on the government to release specific
information to the public (without a request under the FOIA or
its state versions); the laws do not mandate the timing of the
release, which would be critical for the public to make timely
236. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, supra note 33.
237. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1.
238. See Coronavirus Tax Relief, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/coronavirus-taxrelief-and-economic-impact-payments [https://perma.cc/GN6R-CNJV] (last
updated Aug. 6, 2021); Economic Impact Payments, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/co
ronavirus/economic-impact-payments [https://perma.cc/QGS7-H4C8] (last
updated Aug. 6, 2021).
239. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (March
11, 2021).
240. See discussion supra Sections I.C. and II.B (discussing public access to
information and legal and institutional framework for public access to
information).
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preparations for the pandemic, or the extent of the information
that these authorities must provide to the public, leaving them
at the discretion of the authorities.
Some may not consider such a legal mandate to be
necessary, as significant public concern associated with the
pandemic is expected to pressure the government to provide
pertinent information to the public. However, the authorities
may also have an incentive to conceal or slow down the release
of information for political reasons, as suspected by the public
when the Trump administration required hospitals to bypass the
CDC and report directly to a centralized database in
Washington, D.C.,241 in which case such a delay or concealment
would be adverse to the public interest in the pandemic
situation. Thus, there is a need for a legal adjustment that will
not only authorize but also require the government to disclose
relevant information to the public promptly, as successfully
implemented elsewhere.242
The second part of this proposal is an institutional reform to
establish a bi-partisan institutional control center, such as a
national commission headed by a politically independent agency
(like the politically independent CDC) in charge of controlling
241. See COVID-19 Guidance for Hospital Reporting and FAQs for
Hospitals, Hospital Laboratory, and Acute Care Facility Data Reporting, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/covid-19-faqs-hospitals-hospital-laboratory-acute-care-facility-data-re
porting.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3LU-7WYW] (explaining how hospitals were
required to report COVID-19 data); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump
Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus
.html [https://perma.cc/Y75S-F542] (updated Sept. 9, 2020). Under public
pressure, the Trump administration subsequently reversed this decision,
allowing the CDC to collect and report COVID-19 data. Robbie Whelan, Covid19 Data Will Once Again Be Collected by CDC, in Policy Reversal, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-covid-19-data-system-re
turning-to-cdc-11597945770 [https://perma.cc/WG3X-ZHRN].
242. In South Korea, for example, the government is under such legal
requirements. Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Act No. 17067,
Mar. 4, 2020, art. 6, ¶ 2 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_serv
ice/lawView.do?hseq=53530&lang=ENG. The relevant Korean law, the
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act stipulates in relevant part that
“each citizen shall have the right to know information on the situation of the
outbreak of infectious diseases and the prevention and control of infectious
diseases and how to cope therewith, and the State and local governments shall
promptly disclose the relevant information.” Id. (emphasis added).
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infectious diseases (hereinafter “the Commission”). There is also
no effective coordination mechanism among federal, state, and
local authorities governing pandemic response. Considering the
significant disarray, there is a call for an autonomous
government organization whose decisions are not to be
determined by political considerations.243 There is indeed a need
for an institutional command center to expedite the
implementation of TCQT. Such a command center must be
authorized to collect and disseminate all necessary information
to combat the pandemic, develop and implement effective
guidelines, and coordinate with the other relevant federal
departments and agencies, as well as state and local authorities
for the implementation of TCQT. Successful implementation is
contingent upon acquiring personal protective equipment (PPE)
and other medical equipment in time, and the command center
should also have the authority to secure the crucial equipment
for TCQT for clinics and hospitals in cooperation with state and
local authorities as well as the private sector.
The Commission would be comprised of representatives
from federal, state, and select local governments,244 as well as
representatives of the private sector (e.g., medical equipment
suppliers, pharmaceutical companies, healthcare providers, and
experts in public health). The proposed Commission would be
charged with coordinating among federal, state, and local
authorities and between the public and private sectors, in the
development and implementation of policies and specific
measures to combat the pandemic.
As mentioned above, securing a degree of political
independence will be important for the Commission to develop
policies and implement timely measures in the best interest of
public health, but there is a question whether other pertinent
considerations, such as economic considerations, should be
completely disregarded from the Commission’s decision-making
process. For example, the stay-at-home orders in April may have
stabilized the number of infection cases, but they also caused an
243. See Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 7; see also
Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, supra note 43, at 69.
244. These select local governments should include the city governments of
major metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta,
Philadelphia, Houston, Washington, D.C., and Boston.
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unprecedented number of job losses.245 This concern will
necessitate the inclusion of representatives from the federal
government in the Commission, as well as representatives from
state and local governments. Experts in the head agency could
develop specific policies and guidelines, to be adopted by the
proposed Commission after consultations and deliberation
among the representatives. The adoption of the policies and
guidelines would, ideally, be made by consensus of the
representatives, to secure maximum cooperation for
implementation from federal, state, and local governments, or by
a majority vote where such consensus cannot be reached. The
adopted policies and measures should, in principle, be
implemented through state and local enforcement mechanisms,
rather than through federal preemption.
There could also be a question whether representatives of
the private sector, such as suppliers of medical equipment,
pharmaceutical companies, and healthcare providers, should be
invited to participate in the Commission. The proposed legal
reform will not meet its regulatory objective of securing timely
public access to TCQT without cooperation from the private
sector. Cooperation with the private sector is, thus, essential,
and it would also be important to consider their views in
formulating policies and implementing measures, but there is a
concern that the private sector interests, which may not always
be aligned with the best interest of public health, might
influence (or even dominate) the decision-making process
through collusion, should they be allowed to participate in the
Commission. Considering this adverse possibility, the role of the
private sector representatives should be limited to an advisory
one. The Commission and the government may also assist the
private sector to maintain a proper level of production and
healthcare capacities during the pandemic to secure timely
public access to TCQT.
The proposed Commission should also oversee contact
tracing and isolated treatment in systematic coordination with
state and local authorities. As discussed above, it will be
important to revise federal guidelines on contact tracing so that
there will be uniform criteria for the collection and
dissemination of sensitive private information and that the

245. See Payroll Employment Down 20.5 Million in April 2020, supra note
29 and accompanying text (reporting 20.5 million job losses in April 2020 alone).
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intrusion upon individual privacy will be minimized while
securing the information necessary for contact tracing. The
status of contact tracing should be reported to the Commission’s
head agency, and the Commission should also provide necessary
support to state and local authorities, which require assistance
with their own contact tracing. As for the isolated treatment in
quarantine, the Commission’s task will be to ensure
procurement of sites for treatment facilities, as well as medical
personnel for those facilities,246 again, in close and systematic
coordination with state and local governments, as well as
hospitals, clinics, and medical schools in the region. The
Commission should also develop guidelines on the monitoring
process for those who are ordered to self-quarantine (i.e., those
suspected of infection but not tested positive), and coordinate
with state and local authorities to ensure effective monitoring.
Finally, the proposed Commission, through its head agency,
should also seek to create and maintain international networks
of support and cooperation with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and also with public health agencies in other countries
affected by COVID-19, particularly those countries that have
successfully contained the spread of the pandemic in its early
stages.247 The significant differences in many relevant factors,
such as governance system, institutional frameworks, public
compliance, technological environment, and healthcare system,
set certain limits on the “good policies” adoptable from successful
countries. Considering the failure in the United States, however,
serious efforts must be made to learn the successful practices of
other countries and explore ways to adopt them, perhaps after
making due adjustments.248
B. RELEVANCE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
This article adopts a novel approach to assess the impact of
the proposed legal and institutional reform concerning COVID19 management and to identify possible issues in its
implementation. The adopted approach is originated in law and
246. In South Korea, local public and private accommodations have been
converted to CTCs. See Choi et al., supra note 19.
247. See Berger, supra note 14.
248. For example, extensive, IT-based contact tracing, as well as CTCs
implemented in South Korea, offer exemplary references. See Choi et al., supra
note 19.
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development studies. “‘Law and development’ is an area of
inquiry on the interrelationship between law and
development”249 where “development” is understood as “a
progressive transformation of the economy and society.”250 Law
and development has been concerned primarily with “developing
countries,” exploring the role of law for economic and social
development in these countries; however, the changing economic
and social realities for developed countries, such as regional
economic disparity within developed countries, increasing
income gaps among their citizens, and deepening racial divides,
render a law and development approach relevant to address
economic and social problems in developed countries, the
resolution of which may require a “progressive transformation”
of the underlying economic and social structure through legal
and institutional reform.251
Thus, a law and development approach is also relevant to
assess the legal and institutional reform necessitated by the
failure of COVID-19 management, because the proposed reform
seeks to transform or overcome the underlying economic, social,
and political processes that adversely affect public access to
TCQT during a pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis may not be a
traditional “development” issue, but it is analogous in the sense
that its resolution requires a progressive transformation of the
relevant economic, social, and political conditions that adversely
affect timely public access to TCQT. In the pandemic context, the
relevant economic condition would be the cost issue impacting
public access to testing and treatment, the social condition would
be the prevailing preference for individualism and privacy over
collective response to the pandemic, and the political
consideration would be the pervasive partisan politics and
fragmented authorities in the absence of effective federal
leadership for the first year of the pandemic period.
The assessment of the proposed legal and institutional
reform requires the identification of a suitable analytical device.
Leading scholars in law and development, such as Trubek and
249. THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, at 3.
250. Id. at 11.
251. See id. at 111; see also Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Economic Development
in the United States: Toward a New Paradigm, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 229 (2019);
Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Development in the United States: A Nexus with the
Civil Rights, 44 S. ILL. U. L. J. 433 (2020).
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Galanter (1974),252 Merryman (1977),253 Snyder (1982),254 North
(1991),255 Tamanaha (1995),256 Chibundu (1997),257 Posner
(1998),258 Chua (1998),259 Cross (2002),260 Davis and Trebilcock
(2001),261 Barr and Avi-Yonah (2004),262 McInerney (2005),263

252. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974) (studying the relationship between scholarship
and action, with a focus on scholars’ attempt to create a specialized body of
knowledge).
253. See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On
the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 457 (1977) (arguing why comparative law and social change
is the field for law and development) .
254. See Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of “Law and Development,” WIS. L.
REV. 373 (1982) (reviewing JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN
LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980)); see also Francis G.
Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 723 (1980).
255. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991) (using
economic history to illustrate the role of institutions in economies).
256. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony
Carty ed., 1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, (Sammy Adelman
& Abdul Paliwala, eds. 1993)).
257. See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding
and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 167 (1997) (focusing on
Sub-Saharan Africa to show the relevance of law in the development of Third
World countries).
258. See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic
Development, 13 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 1 (1998) (proposing a framework of
legal reform for economic growth in countries).
259. See Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward A New
Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L. J. 1 (1998) (arguing that
marketization and democratization may drive ethnic tensions).
260. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737
(2002) (surveying the field of research on economic growth and the law).
261. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and
Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 21 (2001) (examining the role of legal
intuitions in the pursuit of development).
262. See Michael S. Barr & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Law and
Development: Introduction and Overview (Globalization, Law and Development
Conference), 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (providing an overview of the key
issues surrounding development in the age of globalization).
263. See Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic
Practice, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (2005) (examining law and
development through a political-theoretical lens).
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Chodosh (2006),264 Dam (2006),265 Chukwumerije (2009),266 and
Prado (2009),267 have addressed a range of issues about law and
development. These scholars have called for new approaches,
including theoretical underpinnings that explain the dynamics
among law, institutions, and the existing political, social, and
economic conditions.268
The recently-developed General Theory responds to this call
and provides an analytical framework to assess the impact of
law, legal frameworks, and institutions (LFIs) on economic and
social development.269 The General Theory is comprised of two
parts: the first part of the theory sets the disciplinary
parameters of law and development, and the second part
explains the causal relationship between law and development
through “the regulatory impact mechanisms,” which refers to
the mechanisms by which law impacts development, with
references made to institutional frameworks and socioeconomic
conditions.270 The second part of the General Theory, namely the
regulatory impact mechanisms, addresses the impact of the
proposed legal and institutional reform.271 The remainder of this
section introduces the relevant part of the theory (the regulatory
impact mechanisms).272 Part IV applies the General Theory to
the proposed legal and institutional reform and examines its
impact and expected implementation issues.273
The regulatory impact mechanisms are comprised of three
analytical
elements:
“regulatory
design,”
“regulatory
264. See HIRAM E. CHODOSH, GLOBAL JUSTICE REFORM: A COMPARATIVE
METHODOLOGY (2005) (outlining the risks and benefits of the comparative
methodology in global justice reform).
265. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006) (examining the underlying mechanisms
through which the law, judiciary, and legal profession influence the economy).
266. See Okezie Chukwumerije, Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Link Between
the Rule of Law and Economic Development, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2009)
(looking at the limitations of the rule of law on economic growth in developing
countries).
267. See Mariana Prado, Should We Adopt a “What Works” Approach in Law
and Development?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 174 (2009).
268. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 417.
269. Id. at 418.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 456.
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compliance,” and “quality of implementation,” with additional
sub-elements under each of these three elements.274 These
elements are conceptually distinct but interrelated and
influence one another.275 The first element of the regulatory
impact mechanisms, regulatory design, analyzes how law is
designed to achieve a development objective.276 Regulatory
design is analyzed by three sub-elements: anticipated policy
outcome; organization of law, legal frameworks, and institutions
(LFIs); and law’s adaptation to socioeconomic conditions.277 The
first sub-element, anticipated policy outcome, refers to the
outcome of the policy that law is anticipated to deliver.278 For
example, an increase in the number of diagnostic tests
performed would be the anticipated policy outcome of a law that
mandates covering the cost of testing. Examination of the
anticipated policy outcome is aided by methods and analytics of
relevant social sciences, which include, but are not limited to,
economics, political science, anthropology, and sociology.279
The second sub-element, organization of LFIs, examines the
dynamics and interrelations among law, applicable legal
frameworks, and relevant institutions.280 Regulatory design is
enhanced by positive synergies among the constituent elements
of LFIs.281 For example, a law that aims to ensure social
distancing and mask-wearing in public places may not be
effective without operative institutional frameworks, such as an
enforcement mechanism against violations. The third subelement, adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, examines
whether law conforms to relevant social, political, economic, and
cultural conditions (“socioeconomic conditions”).282 For instance,
a law that aims to provide timely public access to information
related to COVID-19 will have only limited impact on improving
information accessibility if the underlying socioeconomic
conditions are incompatible; e.g., where a majority of the
population culturally disfavor releasing their private

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 418.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Id..
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
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information (such as the time and location of their visits after
contracting the virus) even during a pandemic. Thus, adaptation
to the prevailing socioeconomic conditions is essential to the
successful operation of law, and in this example, a law will have
to mandate extensive public engagement and education
campaigns to solicit cooperation from the public.
In addition to the regulatory design which is assessed by the
anticipated policy outcome, an organization of LFIs, and the
law’s adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, the General
Theory presents two other elements to determine the impact of
law: regulatory compliance and quality of implementation.283
The second element, regulatory compliance, examines
compliance with law by the public.284 Law would not have impact
without due compliance by the public, who are subject to the
application of law.285 Regulatory compliance is analyzed under
two sub-elements: general regulatory compliance and specific
regulatory compliance.286 General regulatory compliance
examines the overall level of compliance with law in a given
jurisdiction.287 Social and political factors, such as legal culture
in society and public confidence in the state implementing law,
influence general regulatory compliance.288 Specific regulatory
compliance pertains to the strength of compliance with a
particular law.289 A key element determining specific regulatory
compliance is the consistency between a particular law and the
socioeconomic conditions on the ground;290 i.e., even in a society
where general regulatory compliance is strong, a particular law
may still have weak compliance when it does not conform to the
socioeconomic conditions prevailing on the ground.291 A law that
mandates quarantine of those infected with COVID-19 in a CTCtype facility may not attract strong regulatory compliance
without incentives, where a culture that emphasizes individual
autonomy and freedom prevails.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 418.
Id. at 446, fig. 5.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446–48.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 447.
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The third and final element under the regulatory impact
mechanisms is quality of implementation.292 This element
assesses the degree to which a state meets the requirements of
law and undertakes its mandates to fulfill regulatory
objectives.293 Laws which are otherwise well-designed and
command strong compliance by the public will not have much
impact if the state fails to properly implement them.294 In the
preceding example, a law that attempts to ensure social
distancing and mask-wearing in public places would not be
successful unless the state implements them effectively by
enforcing these laws with sufficient capacity (e.g., competent
personnel, technical resources, adequate budget). State capacity,
including its financial, technological, and administrative
capabilities for the implementation of law, is a key determinant
of the quality of implementation.295 The implementation of law
also requires a degree of political will, particularly when
implementation poses political challenges for reasons including
conflicts of interest and preferences within a society and among
different segments of the population.296 Political will would be
necessary to enforce mask-wearing mandates where a
significant portion of the population feels uncomfortable wearing
masks, rendering such a mandate politically unpopular. These
two factors, state capacity and political will, are essential
elements that determine the quality of implementation.297
IV. APPLYING THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT
A. REGULATORY DESIGN
Under the General Theory, the impact of the proposed
reform is assessed against its analytical elements, beginning
with the first—regulatory design—and the three sub-elements,

292. Id. at 450.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 451–52.
296. Id. at 454.
297. See Yong-Shik Lee, General Theory of Law and Development: An
Overview, 12 L. & DEV. REV. 351, 368–71 (2019) (analyzing the ways in which
state capacity and political will impact the ability of the state to implement a
given law).
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anticipated policy outcome, organization of LFIs, and adaptation
to socioeconomic conditions.298
1. Anticipated Policy Outcome
The proposed legal requirement to ensure timely public
access to TCQT is expected to expedite the government’s
preparations if the law identifies each of the governmental steps
to be taken and sets timelines for each of these steps. The
proposed reform reduces political discretion embedded in the
current law by imposing a mandatory requirement on the
government to take preparatory steps in pre-set timelines.299
Currently, there is no recourse under the law when the
government does not exercise its legal authority to mobilize
resources and make preparations, as shown by the conduct of the
previous Trump administration which neglected to proceed
expeditiously with preparations during the early stages of the
pandemic, leaving the primary responsibility of controlling the
pandemic to the state and local authorities. This must be
remedied by adding a legal requirement for the government to
take specific steps to ensure timely public access to TCQT.300 The
proposed amendment to link vaccination to individual tax relief
and payments may also increase the rate of vaccination,
although it is unclear how effective such economic incentive will
be for those who object to vaccination for political reasons or
concerns about possible side-effects after vaccination.301
As for the proposed institutional reform, the anticipated
policy outcome of setting a national, bi-partisan Commission
headed by a politically independent agency will be the
separation of the pandemic response from political
considerations that may delay timely public warnings and
preparations. This anticipated policy outcome will be enhanced
by ensuring the political autonomy of the proposed Commission
as a fully independent regulatory agency, such as the Securities

298. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 436.
299. See discussion supra Section II.A.
300. A statutory right should be granted to members of the public so that an
individual may have standing to challenge a violation.
301. The CDC reports that possible side effects are likely mild. Possible Side
Effects After Getting a COVID-19 Vaccine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Sep. 30, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccin
es/expect/after.html [https://perma.cc/KME3-ZRJR].
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and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve. This
separation will also have the effect of enhancing coordination
among federal, state, and local authorities, minimizing partisan
political interests and interferences in the development and
implementation of measures to combat the pandemic.
2. Organization of LFIs
The second sub-element under the regulatory design is
organization of LFIs.302 A question may be raised whether
requiring the federal government to ensure public access to
TCQT would be compatible with the federal legal system in the
United States, whose Constitution limits the role of the federal
government.303 Some may argue that the job should be left with
state and local authorities, as well as the private sector. Another
potential question is whether the no cost-share requirement for
TCQT will be compatible with the current private healthcare
system, where a majority of the public rely on private healthcare
provisions whereby the financial arrangement for the cost is to
be determined by private insurance contracts. As for the first
question, the lesson from the current pandemic is that
irrespective of the federal system, leaving the primary
responsibility to combat COVID-19 to state and local
governments, whose resources may not be sufficient to deal with
a pandemic on a national or an international scale, or to the
private sector, whose interests may not necessarily be aligned
with public health interests, does not ensure successful control
of the disease. The federal government, armed with superior
resources and information, must be required to take the lead and
adopt the necessary steps to respond to the pandemic in predefined timelines. This proposed legal adjustment is necessary
to ensure the federal response. The proposal is not to supersede
or preempt state and local authorities; rather, it is to create a
strong coordination mechanism, in conjunction with the
proposed Commission, so that the policies and measures that are
developed to control the pandemic are implemented through

302. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 419 (“[R]egulatory design is analyzed in
the following three categories (sub-elements): anticipated policy outcome;
organization of law, legal frameworks, and institutions (‘LFI’); and adaptation
to socioeconomic conditions . . . .”).
303. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor [the powers] prohibited by [the Constitution] to the
states, are reserved to the states . . . .”).
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state and local enforcement mechanisms in systematic
cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities. The
proposed Commission, as an institutional control center, should
serve this function.
As for the second question—the federal government’s
guarantee for vaccination, testing, and treatment costs—the
current federal COVID-19 legislation already requires
healthcare insurance providers not to impose cost-sharing on the
insured for tests, vaccines, and preventive care.304 The proposed
reform adds a requirement for the government to make an
explicit guarantee to the public that they will bear no out-ofpocket cost for COVID-19 related treatment regardless of their
insurance status; the objective is to ensure that the public will
not be discouraged from seeking treatment because of cost
concern and that this concern will not become a cause for further
spread of the disease.305 The explicit government guarantee will
be required to contain the spread of the disease by timely testing
and treatment, and any personal benefit to COVID-19 patients
is incidental and subordinate to the national interest to contain
the pandemic. Thus, the proposed legal adjustment will be
consistent with the powers granted to the federal government in
the context of a national emergency.306

304. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 6001–
6004, 134 Stat. 178, 201–08 (waiving cost-sharing on COVID-19 testing and
certain clinical visits related to testing); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l,
1396d(a)(3)(B) (2020) (establishing authorization to waive requirements during
national emergencies); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 3201, 3203(a), 134 Stat. 184, 366–67 (ordering insurance
providers to cover COVID-19 testing, preventive services, and vaccines); 41
U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020) (covering preventive services).
305. Witters, supra note 61 (presenting evidence that one in every seven
Americans (14%) is deterred from seeking healthcare for themselves or a family
member when experiencing COVID-19 symptoms due to high healthcare costs).
306. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm-61 (2018)
(authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to lead medical
response to public health emergencies); Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2018) (authorizing delivery
of federal assistance to states and localities during emergencies); National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2018) (establishing ground rules for
how the federal government responds to national emergencies).
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3. Adaptation to Socioeconomic Conditions
As to the adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, the third
sub-element for the regulatory design, a relevant question is
whether the proposed reform can be supported by financial,
technical, and cultural conditions on the ground.307 The legal
reform, which will require the government to ensure timely
public access to TCQT, necessitates securing sufficient
quantities of test kits, masks, PPE, medicine, contact tracers,
and medical facilities. The relevant industries reportedly have
sufficient production capacities for medical supplies,308 but
securing a needed number of contact tracers to perform contact
tracing as well as treatment centers to isolate asymptomatic and
mildly symptomatic patients could prove to be a challenge. The
role of the federal government is to ensure, in close coordination
with state and local authorities, as well as with the private
sector counterparts, that sufficient quantities of medical
supplies are produced, secured, and distributed in time; enough
contact tracers are recruited throughout the country; and the
sites for treatment centers are secured. Monitoring will be
another issue, with the monitored quarantine of those who have
not tested positive but have been exposed to the risk of infection.
It might be a challenge to acquire the capacity for proper
monitoring.
As for the proposed Commission, strong bi-partisan support
will be necessary at the federal, state, and local levels to ensure
the successful operation of the Commission. A question may be
raised whether the current partisan and divisive political
environment is conducive to the successful operation of such a
bi-partisan Commission where representatives from federal,
state, and local authorities must cooperate and coordinate in the
development and implementation of policies and measures.
There is a risk that the partisan political interests among the
representatives may impede the work of the Commission, and it
remains to be seen whether the unprecedented magnitude of the

307. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 444 (defining socioeconomic conditions
as a range of social, political, economic, and cultural conditions).
308. See, e.g., Tracker: How Businesses Are Accelerating Production of
Critical Medical Supplies to Combat the Coronavirus, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.,
https://www.uschamber.com/article/tracker-how-businesses-are-accelerating-p
roduction-of-critical-medical-supplies-combat-the [https://perma.cc/KR7W-JXN
Q] (last updated May 12, 2020) (listing efforts of forty-four American businesses
to provide aid for the coronavirus response).
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current pandemic will generate popular support or pressure for
a bi-partisan effort to form a united front against the pandemic.
The leadership role of the politically independent head agency,
as well as support from political leaders, expert groups, and the
general population, will be crucial for the success of the
Commission.
B. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
The second analytical element in the regulatory impact
mechanisms, regulatory compliance, is also relevant to assess
the proposed reform. As discussed above, regulatory compliance
is analyzed by two sub-elements: general regulatory compliance
and specific regulatory compliance.309
1. General Regulatory Compliance
The level of regulatory compliance, which refers to the
general level of regulatory compliance in a given jurisdiction, can
be measured by proxy indicators such as the rule of law indexes
compiled by the World Justice Project and the World Bank, as
the rule of law would not be feasible without regulatory
compliance.310 The ratings of the United States are high on these
indexes: twenty-first among 128 countries under the Rule of Law
Index 2020 by World Justice Report and 89.9 percentile under
the Rule of Law Indicator 2020 by the World Bank,311 indicating
a high level of general regulatory compliance. This outcome is
consistent with a prevailing observation that the United States
has one of the world’s most advanced legislative, judicial, and
law enforcement systems, the combination of which is bound to

309. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 446 (“Regulatory compliance can be
classified into general regulatory compliance, which refers to the general level
of regulatory compliance in a given jurisdiction, and specific regulatory
compliance, which pertains to a particular law.”).
310. Rule of Law Index 2020, WORLD JUST. PROJECT (2020), https://worldju
sticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XU6Z-AE6S] (“[M]easuring the rule of law based on the
experiences and perceptions of the general public and in-country legal
practitioners and experts worldwide.”); Worldwide Governance Indicators,
WORLD BANK (2020), https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ [https://perma
.cc/L682-PZK2] (reporting “aggregate and individual governance indicators for
over 200 countries and territories . . . for six dimensions of government.”).
311. WORLD JUST. PROJECT, supra note 310, at 154; WORLD BANK, supra
note 310.
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command generally a high level of regulatory compliance by the
public. The long tradition of the rule of law, which began with
the birth of the nation, is also conducive to general regulatory
compliance.
2. Specific Regulatory Compliance
Against this backdrop, specific regulatory compliance can be
assessed. Regulatory compliance does not mean only the absence
of rule violations, but also the knowledge of law and
participation in the processes mandated by law.312 There have
been substantial compliance and implementation issues in
pandemic management.
In the crucial weeks of February through early March of
2020, the Trump administration failed to inform the public
about the danger of the disease and to present effective
guidelines for mitigating its spread.313 The administration had
banned entry from China in January of 2020 to prevent further
spread of the disease from the place that was believed to be its
origin,314 but the Trump administration neither cautioned the
public about the risk of the spread of the disease within the
United States nor made due preparations, such as securing a
sufficient number of test kits and face masks to be made
available to the public.315 The lack of follow-up actions led the
public to believe—at least until the first half of March when they
witnessed the rapidly increasing number of infections and the
declaration of a national emergency by the President—that the
pandemic was largely a problem occurring outside the country
and that it was not, therefore, necessary to make serious

312. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 446 (“[J]udicial reform would not be as
effective where only a small minority of the population uses the court for dispute
resolution.”).
313. See Philip Mirvis, Reflections: US Coronavirus Crisis Management—
Learning from Failure Donald Trump and More, January—April, 2020, 20 J.
CHANGE MGMT. 283 (2020) (recounting former-President Trump’s “alarmist”
labeling of coronavirus warnings and partial travel ban that permitted 40,000
travelers to and from China amidst the crisis).
314. Proclamation 9984, supra note 92, §§ 1–2 (suspending entry from
China).
315. See Mirvis, supra note 313, at 293–94 (“A key challenge was to come to
grips with the healthcare system’s supply chain with projected shortages of
hospital beds, breathing ventilators, masks, and other personal protective
equipment.”).
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preparations for COVID-19.316 Until mid-March, the federal
government did not issue any mandate or guideline for public
compliance.
This complacency was turned into pressing stress on the
public in the following sequence. The government had been
unsuccessful in conducting a sufficient number of tests and
contact tracing, consequently failing to contain the spread of the
pandemic. As a result, the number of infections and the death
toll skyrocketed from late February to early March.317
Unprepared to handle the pandemic, states resorted to the most
drastic measures, such as stay-at-home orders and non-essential
business closures, to contain the spread of the disease.318 These
measures appear to have stabilized the rate of infections by midApril but exerted considerable economic, psychological, and
social pressure on the public, as demonstrated by public
objections and mass protests.319 When states started to lift stayat-home orders and re-open businesses in late April,320 the
federal government issued guidelines for re-opening but without
any mandate on essential measures, such as mask mandates.321
316. See, e.g., JOHN STERNFELD, UNPREPARED: AMERICA IN THE TIME OF
CORONAVIRUS (2020) (tracing the trajectory of the development of the
coronavirus and analyzing the adequacy of the response of the United States
government throughout); see also Ethan Epstein, America the Complacent,
WASH. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar
/1/america-has-become-complacent-when-it-comes-corona/ [https://perma.cc/T3
GW-CLLA] (“Americans seem blithely unaware that in just a few short weeks
their lives could be upended with lockdowns . . . .”).
317. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (accounting for the increase in
the number of infection cases).
318. Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State,
and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID19, supra note 3, at 10 (“[C]hronicling the federal and state legal response from
January to July 2020 . . . .”).
319. See, e.g., Michael Martina & Seth Herald, Hundreds Protest Michigan
Stay-at-Home Order, REUTERS (May 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-health-coronavirus-michigan-protest/hundreds-protest-michigan-stay-at-h
ome-order-idUSKBN22Q1IL (covering protests against state governmentmandated lockdowns in Michigan in May of 2020).
320. Alaa Elassar, This is Where Each State is During Its Phased Reopening,
CNN (May 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-c
oronavirus-trnd/ [https://perma.cc/MV94-SJF7].
321. Alana Wise, READ: White House Guidelines to States for Reopening,
NPR (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/16/836489480/read-white-ho
use-guidelines-to-states-for-reopening [https://perma.cc/7JNQ-KNCN]. There is
controversy as to whether the federal government has the authority to impose
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Varied state and local mandates, sometimes in conflict with one
another,322 created a sub-optimal environment for public
compliance with the measures adopted by state and local
governments.
Under such an environment, public compliance with mask
mandates, which is one of the most important measures to
prevent the spread of the disease, has varied by region, with the
most compliant areas in the Northeast and along the West
Coast, and lower levels of compliance in the Plains and the
South.323 There is no federal, national mask mandate in place,324
but the CDC recommends that all individuals over two years of
age wear a mask in a public setting or around people who live in
a separate household.325 The number of American adults
wearing masks has been increasing; in June of 2020 only 65
percent of American adults reported regularly wearing face

a federal mask mandate. The government may invoke Section 361 of the Public
Health Service Act (PHSA), which grants the federal government the authority
to make and enforce regulations necessary “to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into
the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State
or possession.” 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2018). However, a counterargument is that
Section 361 authorizes the federal government to take measures against
dissemination across national or state borders; thus, a federal mask mandate
cannot be imposed on an individual who does not travel across national or state
borders. See WEN W. SHEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10530, COULD THE
PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS ENACT A NATIONWIDE MASK MANDATE? (2020)
(discussing potential legal issues with a federal mask mandate); see also John
Yoo & James C. Phillips, The Constitutionality of Federal Mask Mandates, AM.
ENTER. INST. (July 27, 2020), https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-constitutionality-o
f-federal-mask-mandates/ (arguing the federal government cannot implement a
mask mandate).
322. See Cole, supra note 107; Reimann, supra note 108 and accompanying
text (discussing disagreements and disputes among state and local authorities).
323. Josh Katz et al., A Detailed Map of Who Is Wearing Masks in the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/17/up
shot/coronavirus-face-mask-map.html [https://perma.cc/V87J-XCZY].
324. See WEN W. SHEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10530, COULD THE
PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS ENACT A NATIONWIDE MASK MANDATE? (2020) and
accompanying text (discussing the lack of a federal mask mandate and potential
legal issues).
325. Guidance for Wearing Masks; Help Slow the Spread of COVID-19,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.cdc.go
v/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover-guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/QT8D-RB3K].
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masks in public, but that number increased to 85 percent within
the first two weeks of August.326
In the context of the proposed reform, the public is expected
to show support and compliance with the law that requires the
government to ensure timely public access to testing and
treatment, as they are the beneficiary of the law reform.
However, regulatory compliance may become an issue for the
implementation of a law that requires timely contact tracing and
isolation of COVID-19 patients. Those subject to contact tracing
for exposure to infection will have to disclose the personal
information required for contact tracing. Some may not be
willing to disclose personal information. This means that
participation in contact tracing may have to be incentivized;
compulsion may not be effective and may only backfire where a
culture emphasizing privacy prevails. Forms of incentives may
include granting a priority for treatment.
As for the proposed treatment in isolation, some of the
asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic COVID-19 patients may
not accept mandatory isolated treatment in public facilities for
days (i.e., five to ten days until they test negative) and may resist
involuntary separation from their families and removal from
their homes,327 even if it is necessary to contain the disease. An
incentive offer, such as full coverage of the cost of the isolated
treatment by the government, may improve compliance.
Additional incentives, such as job protection during the period of
isolation, care arrangements for the patient’s minor children and
elderly parents, and a guarantee for hospital admission if the
patient’s condition deteriorates while staying at the treatment
center, could also be offered to improve compliance, although
offering the latter incentive might be difficult in places where
hospitals are reaching capacity. Also possible is an opt-out
option, under which the patient is allowed to make their own
arrangements for isolation if they demonstrate to the
326. Stephanie Kramer, More Americans Say They Are Regularly Wearing
Masks in Stores and Other Businesses, PEW RSCH. CTRS. (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/27/more-americans-say-they-a
re-regularly-wearing-masks-in-stores-and-other-businesses/ [https://perma.cc
/2E3V-45NA].
327. See Choi et al., supra note 19 (detailing the use of Community
Treatment Centers in South Korea); see also Gonsalves et al., supra note 215,
at 3 (“Individuals will not cooperate with self-isolation or other voluntary social
distancing measures if they are unable to provide for themselves and their
families.”).
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government that they can meet the criteria for effective
isolation. In the latter case, a monitoring system should also be
in place. Similar compliance issues may also arise for the
monitored quarantine of those who have not tested positive but
were exposed to the risk of infection and the public release of
some of the private information acquired through contact
tracing; some incentives might be necessary to enhance
regulatory compliance.
C. QUALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION
Lastly, the proposed reform is assessed against the last
element under the regulatory impact mechanisms, quality of
implementation, which “refers to the act of a state meeting the
requirements of law and undertaking mandates under the terms
of law to fulfill its objectives.”328 As discussed above, state
capacity and political will are essential elements that determine
the quality of implementation.329
1. State Capacity
The United States has the world’s largest state capacity for
the implementation of law:330 with its vast financial,
technological, and administrative resources, the federal
government has greater capacity than any other government to
meet the requirement of the proposed reform, which mandates
that the government ensure timely public access to TCQT,
including setting up CTC-type facilities for the isolated
treatment of all COVID-19 patients.
The proposed amendment will require financial,
administrative, and technical resources to ensure the sufficient
supply of test kits, PPE, vaccines, medicines, and care facilities,
and to collect and release pertinent information promptly. State
and local governments may not have sufficient resources to
undertake these tasks, but the federal government can cooperate
with state and local authorities to implement the proposed
amendment across the country.
As for the proposed Commission, it is also well within the
state capacity of the United States to establish such a

328. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 450.
329. Id. at 451.
330. See id. at 451–52 (discussing the United States’ extensive capacity for
legal implementation).
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Commission and support its activities: logistical requirements to
set up such a Commission, such as the creation of an extensive
communications facility, and providing the head agency with
necessary financial, technical, and administrative resources will
not likely be a challenge to the state capacity of the United
States. The proposed Commission will have to coordinate with
state and local health authorities in the implementation of its
policies. The resources at the disposal of the federal government
will likely be sufficient to support such coordination. A more
likely challenge to implement the proposed reform will be a
political one, rather than state capacity, as further discussed
below.
2. Political Will
Political will, another important element to determine the
quality of implementation, may prove to be an issue. The
magnitude of the unprecedented health crisis requires
extraordinary political leadership at the federal, state, and local
levels for successful management. Indeed, effective political
leadership has guided populations in other countries that have
better managed COVID-19.331 Such political leadership has been
lacking in the United States, particularly at the federal level
under the Trump administration. Traditionally, Presidents have
accepted political responsibility and exercised leadership during
periods of crisis.332 However, the Trump administration failed to
show such leadership for the management of COVID-19: the
administration initially downplayed the seriousness of the
pandemic and delegated the management responsibilities
largely to state and local governments.333 As discussed above,
the pandemic is a national and international emergency. As
such, it requires a national response with national (federal)
leadership, and state and local initiatives are insufficient to
overcome the crisis.

331. See, e.g., Michael J. Ahn, Combating COVID-19: Lessons from South
Korea, BROOKINGS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2
020/04/13/combating-covid-19-lessons-from-south-korea/ [https://perma.cc/2VY
3-GVNQ] (detailing the actions taken by the South Korean government against
COVID-19).
332. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 3.
333. Id. at 4.
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The sharp partisan divide in United States politics, which
has been deepening for decades, as well as former President
Trump’s dismissive attitude about the pandemic, contributed to
the lacking federal leadership. As this President had been
elected without majority support from the population,334 he
displayed innate limits on his ability to unite Americans for a
common cause. A majority of his supporters were concentrated
in the midwestern and southern regions of the United States,
rather than the population and economic centers on the eastern
and western coasts.335 This divide, again coupled with Trump’s
negative attitudes and failures, created confrontations and gaps
between the administration on the one hand and the economic
and political elites, mass media, and scientific communities on
the other, generating an adverse political environment for
building a united frontline against COVID-19. The divide not
only existed at the federal level but also permeated into the state
and local levels, as revealed by the confrontations and disputes
between state and local authorities.336
Improved leadership would be necessary to introduce an
effective form of treatment that has been successful in
containing the pandemic in other countries; for example, South
Korea introduced the treatment of asymptomatic and mildly
symptomatic COVID-19 patients in physically isolated
Community Treatment Centers (CTCs) located throughout the
country.337 In the United States, such patients do not receive
medical treatment and are only recommended to self-quarantine
at home.338 There is no monitoring of quarantine, and the
patients’ family members and even neighbors are exposed to the

334. 2016 US Presidential Election Map by County & Vote Share, BRILLIANT
MAPS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://brilliantmaps.com/2016-county-election-map/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/U8YD-B2BR].
335. Snopes, Counting Blue Counties, in THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note
46, at 118, n.610; see also Brilliant Maps, supra note 334 (showing vote share
by county for the 2016 United States presidential election).
336. See Reimann supra note 108; Chiu, supra note 109 (discussing disputes
and disagreements between state and local authorities).
337. See Choi et al., supra note 19 (detailing South Korea’s use of
Community Treatment Centers).
338. See Coronavirus (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.h
tml [https://perma.cc/5EZJ-6HUG] (directing individuals with symptoms of
COVID-19 to quarantine).
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risk of infection, depending on how quarantine is done by the
individual. Self-quarantine has limits and, coupled with the
failure to conduct contact tracing in the early stages of the
pandemic, contributed to the rapid spread of the pandemic. In
contrast, South Korea was able to operate CTCs where COVID19 patients were admitted, isolated from the rest of the
population, except medical personnel, and received medical
treatment and transferred to hospitals when necessary.339
Patients were released once they no longer tested COVID
positive.
The isolated treatment of all COVID-19 patients was a core
reason for South Korea’s success in containing the disease.
South Korea has been unsuccessful in securing the sufficient
amount of vaccines in time due to late negotiations but has still
been able to control the number of infections and deaths340 well
below hospital capacity thanks to effective TCQT: CTCs have
been set up by converting accommodation facilities, and the
government assumed the cost of testing and treatment at CTCs.
The introduction of this system will be instrumental to contain
the disease, but substantial political leadership will be required
to persuade COVID-19 patients with mild or no symptoms to
stay for days in an isolated place, where many may not feel
comfortable with this type of isolated treatment, even with the
aforementioned incentives. It also takes considerable political
leadership to secure facilities to convert to CTC-type treatment
centers and make an arrangement for the cost reimbursement of
accommodation and treatment under the private healthcare
system, unlike South Korea with its prevailing public healthcare
system.341 The proposal will indeed be politically challenging,
but effective leadership, which facilitates the isolated treatment
for all COVID-19 patients, will result in saving lives.
Vaccination is also important to save lives and contain the
disease, but as mentioned, as of this writing, nearly half the
population has not been fully vaccinated, and over 40 percent of
the population has not yet received a single dose.342 Those who
object to vaccination for reasons including political ones may
339. See Choi et al., supra note 19, at 2338 (detailing the use of community
treatment centers to combat the spread of COVID-19 in South Korea).
340. KOREA DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION AGENCY, supra note 8.
341. See, e.g., Maizland & Felter, supra note 12 (detailing South Korea’s
quick response to contain the COVID-19 pandemic).
342. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, supra note 33.
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well resist and challenge the proposed financial incentives
linked to the Coronavirus Tax Relief and Payments as
unacceptable discrimination against them. Political leadership
will be required to implement such incentives over political
challenges and persuade a significant number of the population
still resisting or avoiding vaccination to get vaccinated for their
own protection and the protection of others. It remains to be seen
whether the new Biden administration will be able to exercise
such political leadership and increase vaccination.
Concerning the proposed legal reform, the federal
administration may for political considerations not welcome a
legal requirement to take mandatory steps to prepare for the
pandemic in pre-defined timelines: the administration may well
consider such a requirement to undermine its political discretion
by reducing its political options in the pandemic situation. As
discussed above, the Trump administration initially downplayed
the seriousness of the pandemic, as demonstrated by lack of
timely preparations, due to the pandemic’s adverse effect on his
re-election in November of 2020.343 The proposed legal
requirement will remove such an expedient political option
relating to the management of the pandemic. The libertarianminded administration may also consider the part of the
proposed law that requires timely quarantine and isolated
treatment of COVID-19 patients, as well as mandatory contact
tracing and public release of some of the private information
acquired through contact tracing, as exceeding the bounds of
governmental authority and politically unsupportable, even if
the federal government may have legal authorities.344 The
administration, therefore, may lack the political will to support
and implement the proposed legal reform.
As for the proposed Commission, the administration may
also consider such a Commission to be adversarial to its political
interest; the politically independent head agency will not be
subject to the control of the President, at least not directly, and
may develop policies, guidelines, and mandatory measures
without political considerations favoring the administration.
The proposed system of coordination will also create direct
343. See Bennett, supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the
political impact of COVID-19 in the United States).
344. 42 C.F.R. pts. 70 and 71 (2020) (outlining the broad powers afforded to
the federal government to combat public health emergencies related to
communicable diseases).

2021]

MANAGING COVID-19

73

channels of cooperation and coordination with federal, state, and
local authorities, which is to be headed by this politically
independent agency; the administration may consider such a
system as weakening its influence and control over the pandemic
response. Thus, implementing the proposed law and
institutional reform will require a federal administration with a
strong political will to set up an optimal legal and institutional
framework for the welfare of the people, rather than one
embedded in a partisan political interest.
V. CONCLUSION
COVID-19 represents an unprecedented public health
failure in the United States, causing over 44.8 million infections
and over 720,000 deaths in less than two years of the
pandemic.345 The infection of former President Trump with
COVID-19 was a symbolic testament to this failure; the former
President, who was expected to lead the national effort to combat
COVID-19, failed to comply with safety guidelines, such as
wearing face masks in public, and downplayed the seriousness
of the pandemic for his re-election concerns,346 instead of
encouraging the public to follow guidelines and cooperate with
public health authorities. The former President may have
recovered from the disease within only a few days, thanks to the
state-of-the-art facilities and the then-experimental medicine
made available to him, but other COVID-19 patients not in such
a privileged position were dying by the thousands daily. The
daily death toll has been reduced since then, but still hundreds
of COVID-19 patients are losing their lives daily, and over 40
percent of the population in the United States remains
unvaccinated at the time of writing.347
Many lives would have been saved had the federal
government ensured public access to TCQT in the early stages
of the pandemic. Several factors other than the conduct of the
government, such as system of governance, institutional
frameworks, public compliance, technological environment, and
healthcare system structure, have affected the country’s

345. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1.
346. See Bennett, supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the
political impact of COVID-19 in the United States).
347. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, supra note 33.
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readiness for the pandemic. Among these factors, the United
States healthcare system, which is unique among the highincome countries as reliant on job-based private health
insurance, limited access to testing and treatment for tens of
millions of Americans, who were either uninsured or underinsured, due to concerns about the cost,348 particularly in the
earlier weeks of the pandemic when immediate testing and
treatment were crucial for containing the disease. Subsequent
COVID-19 legislation relieved some of this cost burden,
including the cost of testing and vaccination,349 but provisions
for the cost of treatment remain variant by states and localities.
There is a call for overhauling the current healthcare system;
scholars advocate for a single-payer system that has been
instrumental to securing unfettered public access to testing and
treatment in other countries adopting that system.350
The politicization of the COVID-19 response has also
impeded efforts to control the disease. In the center of the
controversy lies former President Trump’s unsupportive
attitude about state and local efforts to contain the disease, such
as stay-at-home orders, business closures, and mask mandates,
which had the effect of encouraging his supporters to defy them
in mass protests.351 The fragmented authorities among federal,
state, and local governments in COVID-19 management also
caused open disputes, disagreements, and even lawsuits among
them, creating further confusion among the public.352 The

348. See Witters, supra note 61 (reporting that concerns over cost deterred
early testing).
349. See, e.g., The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) of 2020
§§ 6001–6004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3) (2020); Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020 § 3201 (amending
FFCRA § 6001 to apply coverage without cost-sharing to out-of-network tests),
§ 3203(a), 41 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020).
350. See, e.g., Maizland & Felter, supra note 12 (illustrating the discrepancy
in effectiveness of pandemic response efforts between countries with public
versus private healthcare systems).
351. See, e.g., Martina & Herald, supra note 319 (describing an anti “stayat-home” order protest in Michigan); see also Owen Dyer, Covid-19: Trump
Stokes Protests Against Social Distancing Measures, BMJ (Apr. 21,
2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m1596 [https://perma.cc/9T8Y-F7
V9] (highlighting former President Trump’s tweets calling for the “liberation”
of states from stay-at-home orders, which spurred protests).
352. See discussion supra Section I.B (describing “fragmented authorities”
driving public confusion as COVID-19 emerged).
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vertical division of governmental power may be an essential
feature of the United States federal system, but this divisive
fragmentation has harmed pandemic management throughout
the country. With insufficient coordination among federal, state,
and local governments, the current practice has proved to be
ineffective in controlling a pandemic of national and
international scale.
The timely collection and public release of the information
pertinent to COVID-19, including some information acquired
through contact tracing information, is essential for the public
to stay informed and protect themselves from the pandemic. The
government largely failed to provide public access to such
information, particularly in the crucial first few weeks of the
pandemic.353 While there is a public interest in securing access
to the information, a concern for privacy over the collection and
release of personal information also exists,354 along with a risk
of misuse by a third party or by the government.355 Steps must
be taken to protect privacy and prevent misuse, but striking an
adequate balance between the public need for information and
the right to privacy is not always straightforward. On account of
the unprecedented public health crisis, there is a call for
reinforcing the public interests in the collection and release of
information.
This article proposes legal and institutional reforms to
ensure timely public access to TCQT. Legal and institutional
prescriptions cannot eliminate the adverse influence of politics,
but these prescriptions, at a minimum, offer a blueprint that
guides the government where rule of law prevails. A core
element of the proposed reform is amending existing law to not
only empower, but also to require the federal government, with
vast financial, technological, and administrative resources at its
disposal, to take mandatory steps to ensure public access to
TCQT in pre-defined timelines and to promptly provide the
public with all pertinent information necessary to prevent the
spread of disease.356 The proposed reform also includes the
establishment of a bi-partisan Commission, headed by a
353. See Mirvis, supra note 313 (discussing data collection and
communication failures in the United States Government’s response to the
COVID-19 pandemic).
354. Id. at 530-40.
355. Id.
356. Id.
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politically independent agency in charge of controlling infectious
diseases. The proposed Commission will be responsible for the
development of policies and implementation of measures in
systematic coordination with federal, state, and local
governments, as well as the private sector. The practice adopted
by the former Trump administration, which defers to the
discretion of a federal administration that failed to take timely
steps due to political considerations and to state and local
governments with limited resources and personnel, to manage
the pandemic on their own, is simply untenable for a future
pandemic.

